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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11 during the 
presidency of President George W. Bush. This thesis employs the historical, descriptive and 
analytical approaches to understand deeply US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11. It 
shows the real impact of the 9/11 attacks on the foreign policy towards Palestine, and the US 
initiatives to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through the Bush administration‘s decision to 
recognize the Palestinian state, for the first time in US history. It introduces the theoretical 
frameworks that reflect US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11, including realism, and 
neo-conservatism. It explores the usefulness of adopting a realist perspective to explain the Bush 
administration‘s decision. The thesis focuses on the American interference in Palestinian 
domestic political policy through pressuring the Palestinians to take certain reforms, remove 
President Yasser Arafat, and denounce terrorism, as both the US and Israel regard the resistance 
of the Israeli occupation as terrorism. These were pre-conditions if the Palestinians wanted to 
achieve their independent state. This thesis focuses on the main determinants both domestic and 
international that combine to shape US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11. It focuses on 
how foreign policy decisions are being made in the US, and by whom. The thesis ends with the 
result that the US was never serious about resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but managing 
the conflict to safeguard American national interests in the Middle East, including the security of 
Israel. By doing so, the US succeeded in giving Israel enough time to impose the facts on the 
ground and thus maintaining the status-quo of no negotiations in the Occupied Territories. Thus, 
the US was never an honest and neutral broker between Palestinians and Israelis. 
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 السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية تجاه فلسطيه بعذ أحذاث الحادي عشر مه سبتمبر 
 
 إعذاد:
 وئام عذوان محمذ هماش
 
 إشراف:
  كرايذرد. دان 
 
 ملخص:
خلال انفخشة  سكضث هزِ انشسانت ػهى انسٍاست انخاسجٍت الأيشٌكٍت حجاِ فهسطٍٍ بؼذ أحذاد انحادي ػشش يٍ سبخًبش
نفهى انسٍاست انخاسجٍت . حىظف هزِ انشسانت انطشق انخاسٌخٍت، وانىصفٍت وانخحهٍهٍت انشئاسٍت نهشئٍس جىسج بىش الإبٍ
سبخًبش ػهى انسٍاست  11حظهش انخأرٍش انحمٍمً نهجًاث الأيشٌكٍت بؼًك حجاِ فهسطٍٍ بؼذ أحذاد انحادي ػشش يٍ سبخًبش. 
 بانذونت الاػخشاف، وانًبادساث الأيشٌكٍت نحم انُضاع انفهسطًٍُ الإسشائٍهً يٍ خلال لشاس إداسة بىش انخاسجٍت حجاِ فهسطٍٍ
 انًخحذة نهىلاٌاث انخاسجٍت انسٍاست حؼكس انخً انُظشٌت الأطش مذوح ًوه. انًخحذة انىلاٌاث حاسٌخ فً يشة لأول ، انفهسطٍٍُت
 لشاس نخفسٍش والؼً يُظىس حبًُ فائذة سخكشفح هاإَ. انجذٌذة وانًحافظت ، انىالؼٍت رنك فً بًا ، سبخًبش 11 بؼذ فهسطٍٍ حجاِ
 انفهسطٍٍٍٍُ ػهى انضغظ خلال يٍ انذاخهٍت انفهسطٍٍُت انسٍاسٍت انسٍاست فً الأيشٌكً انخذخم ػهى انشسانت حشكض. بىش إداسة
 وإسشائٍم انًخحذة انىلاٌاث يٍ كم حؼخبش حٍذ ، الإسهاب وإداَت ، ػشفاث ٌاسش انشئٍس وإصانت ، يؼٍُت إصلاحاث لإجشاء
 انشسانت هزِ حشكض. انًسخمهت دونخهى ححمٍك فهسطٍٍُىٌان أساد إرا يسبمت ششوط هزِ كاَج. إسهابًا الإسشائٍهً الاحخلال يماويت
. سبخًبش 11 بؼذ فهسطٍٍ حجاِ الأيشٌكٍت انخاسجٍت انسٍاست نخشكٍم حخضافش انخً وانذونٍت انًحهٍت انشئٍسٍت انًحذداث ػهى
 انىلاٌاث أٌ بُخٍجت الأطشوحت حُخهً. يٍ ٌذ وػهى ، انًخحذة انىلاٌاث فً انخاسجٍت انسٍاست لشاساث احخار كٍفٍت ػهى شكضحو
 فً الأيشٌكٍت انىطٍُت انًصانح نحًاٌت انصشاع إداسة ونكٍ ، الإسشائٍهً انفهسطًٍُ انُضاع حم فً أبذاً  جادة حكٍ نى انًخحذة
 انكافً انىلج إسشائٍم يُح فً انًخحذة انىلاٌاث َجحج ، بزنك انمٍاو خلال يٍ. إسشائٍم أيٍ رنك فً بًا ، الأوسظ انششق
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 نى ، وهكزا. انًحخهت الأساضً فً يفاوضاث أي إجشاء نؼذو انشاهٍ انىضغ ػهى انحفاظ وبانخانً ، الأسض ػهى انحمائك نفشض
  .والإسشائٍهٍٍٍ انفهسطٍٍٍٍُ بٍٍ ويحاٌذا َضٌها وسٍطا أبذا انًخحذة انىلاٌاث حكٍ
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CHAPTER ONE: 
ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1. Introduction 
On the morning of September 11, 2001 four commercial jets, hijacked by members of Al 
Qaeda the terrorist group, crashed into the World Trade Center towers in New York, the 
Pentagon in Washington DC, and rural Pennsylvania (Grunwald, 2001). This attack was as 
surprise for the United States as was the Pearl Harbor attack (Powell, 2011). Both attacks were 
conducted by foreign actors and both were shockingly effective. Both attacks killed almost 3000 
American people (Courtney, 2009). Each attack led to an American foreign policy decision to 
engage in a sustained and costly global war. It is reasonable therefore to ask about the effects of 
such traumatic attacks on policies involving the Middle East and more specifically Palestine, 
especially in the latter case given that the attackers were Arabic speakers. 
US intervention in the Middle East was not limited to a post-9/11 expansion. After World 
War II, the US had multiple national interests in the region, including the security of Israel 
(Schmaglowski, 2007). American presidents and congresses have always been pro-Israel to 
varying degrees and they consider Israel‘s security when they make their foreign policy for the 
Middle East (Zanotti, 2016). Convictional wisdom argues that 9/11 changed everything, never to 
be the same (Litwak, 2002). However, in order to examine the validity of this perspective, we 
need first to understand the definition of American foreign policy, its features, and who 
determine it.   
2 
 
Foreign policy is the means by which any state safeguards its national interests within the 
international system. According to Hill (2003), foreign policy can be defined as purposive action 
conducted by a state to safeguard its national interests (Hill, 2003). The United States is as other 
states within an anarchic international system and uses its foreign policy to stabilize and 
safeguard its national interests given this unruly context. Over the course of the twentieth 
century, officials changed American foreign policy from isolationism to interventionism to 
safeguard such interests (BELLILI, 2015). Thus, US foreign policy pragmatic ally attempts to 
serve American national interests (Hastedt, 2014). Change in strategy is determined by different 
domestic actors. According to Radu (2010) and Trice (1978), US foreign policy is defined by the 
president, Congress, and the interest groups. This research will explore the usefulness of 
adopting a realist perspective to explain US foreign policy, with a focus on the post 9/11 period 
and the Bush administration‘s decision to recognize the Palestinian state.  
After the end of World War II, the US and the Soviet Union emerged as hegemonic 
powers in the world. The Middle East became a strategic region for both powers (Honey & 
Barry, 2000). During the Cold War, Soviet expansion in the Middle East constituted a threat to 
American national interests in the region, including secure access to oil, the protection of pro-
Western monarchies in the Persian Gulf, and the Security of Israel (ibid). Thus, the ―policy of 
containment‖ was an American response to Soviet expansion (Hassassian, 1997). Post-Cold War, 
the U.S became the only hegemonic power in the Middle East, and worked to prevent the 
emergence of Iraq as a new regional power (Prifti, 2017). The US accused Iraq of having 
―weapons of mass destruction,‖ and resorted to the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on 
Iraq on August 6, 1990 (Honey & Barry, 2000, 241). After 9/11, the US declared a ―War on 
Terror‖ to maximize its presence in the Middle East as the only regional hegemon (Prifti, 2017). 
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As a tactic in this grand strategy, the US sought to promote democracy in the region, through 
using ―preemptive actions,‖ ―preventive war,‖ and ―unilateralism.‖ 
Since the end of World War II, the security of Israel has been a priority for the US at the 
expense of Palestinians. All US presidents, republican or democratic, take into consideration 
Israel‘s security when they make their foreign policy in the Middle East (Zanotti, 2016). 
President Harry Truman accepted the UN Partition Plan of Palestine in 1947, and recognized 
Israel as a state in 1948 (Radosh, 2010). The recognition of Israeli statehood was a major action 
with longstanding effects. President John Kennedy did not recognize Palestinians as national 
populace with rights, and he had promoted relations with Israel (Ibid). President Lyndon Johnson 
required Israel to withdrew from the OPT only in return for peace with the Arabs (Tristam, 
2017). President Richard Nixon recognized UN resolution 242, but he failed to force Israel to 
withdraw from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Schmaglowski, 2007). President Jimmy 
Carter mediated the Camp David Accords in 1978 between Israel and Egypt, and he much later 
openly criticized Israel for imposing the apartheid system on Palestinians (Carter, 2006). 
President Ronald Reagan supported the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements in the OPT. 
(Tristam, 2017). President George H. W. Bush supported negotiations between the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel to solve the conflict, but he failed to conduct these 
negotiations. Bush threatened Israel with the stopping of loans until it agreed to participate in the 
Madrid conference in 1991 (Devine, 2008). President Bill Clinton sponsored the Oslo Accords in 
1993, but he failed to promote peace between the two sides. President George W. Bush 
considered President Yasser Arafat as a terrorist, and he put fighting terrorism as a pre-condition 
to achieve an independent Palestinian statehood. (Halabi, 2016). President Barack Obama 
supported the two-state solution, and he promised to end the conflict. However, he failed to 
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fulfill his promises (Effarah, 2013). President Donald Trump officially recognized Jerusalem as 
the capital of Israel in a historic revolution that ended the role of the US as a mediator in the 
peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. In November 2017, Trump refused to renew the 
license of the PLO office in Washington (Hamdi, 2018). Moreover, on September 10, 2018 
Trump announced closure of PLO office.  
 
1.2. Significance of the Study 
Most research done to date has focused on US foreign policy towards the Middle East 
after 9/11, and it has shown that US foreign policy either changed or unchanged. However, this 
thesis will focus on Palestine, and will ask precisely how, if at all, US foreign policy towards 
Palestine after 9/11 changed. This study will cover the administration of President George W. 
Bush, and will shed light on pre-9/11 administrations to examine change and continuity towards 
Palestine after 9/11. This study hopes to provide Palestinian society and researchers who are 
interested in the US foreign policy with clear information and knowledge about the influence of 
the US as a mediator in the peace-process between Palestinians and Israelis. In addition, this 
study seeks to define the roles of the president, Congress, and the Israeli lobby in determining the 
US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11.  Further, this thesis will be based on the 
theoretical framework of realism, as it competes with liberalism, and neo-conservatism to best 
explain US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11.  
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1.3. Definition of the Problem 
Israel is a strategic ally for the United States in the Middle East. They shared fundamental 
ideologies, and the security of Israel represents an important American national interest.  
1.4. Objectives of the Study  
This study aims to:  
 Study and examine US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11.   
 Examine how US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11 changed if at all. 
 Examine the ability of the US to act as a neutral mediator in the peace-process between 
Palestinians and Israelis.  
 
1.5. Research Questions 
In order to understand the US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11 in terms of change 
or continuity, this thesis asks: 
 To what extent and in which ways has the US foreign policy been changed towards 
Palestine after 9/11? 
 Is the US an unbiased mediator in the Peace-Process between Palestinians and Israelis 
after 9/11?  
 
 
The study proposes as a hypothesis that US foreign policy towards Palestine results from 
a complex process driven by national interests and determined by different international 
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and domestic actors. Due to this complexity, some aspects of US foreign policy towards 
Palestine changed and others  remain unchanged after 9/11. 
1.6. Methodology  
This research will be qualitative, based on descriptive, historical and analytical 
methodology. The evidence collected will be written primary and secondary sources such as 
academic books, scholarly articles, news articles, as well as documents from foreign policy 
agencies and speeches of US presidents.  
 
1.7. Theoretical Background  
According to Hill (2003) foreign policy is defined as a site for political actions conducted 
by a state to safeguard its national interests. Thus, the US is similar to all countries around the 
globe in terms of this foreign policy definition. These political actions are produced by many 
domestic actors, including the president, Congress, and the interest groups (Milner & Tingley, 
2015). US foreign policy moved from isolationism to interventionism (Levin, 2011). This 
transition reflects the fact that US foreign policy can change in important ways to serve its 
national interests.  
  
1.7.1. US Foreign Policy as a Revolutionary Policy after 9/11 
This section provides some theoretical background of two groups of scholars: those who 
argue that a revolution happened in US foreign policy toward the Middle East and Palestine after 
7 
 
9/11, and those who argue that a pre-existing policy continue to influence the US foreign policy 
toward the Middle East and Palestine after 9/11.   
 
1.7.1.1. From Crises to Change 
American foreign policy while remarkably stable, can change due to crisis. Halabi (2016) 
emphasizes that after each major crisis, the US changes its foreign policy in a way that creates 
stability and serves American national interests. Thus, US policy-makers changed previous 
policies and replaced them with new ones to solve new problems (Halabi, 2016). Similarly, Prifti 
(2017) asserts that the Bush Doctrine was unique, and departed from previous doctrines because 
the US moved from being peace-loving to war-loving. Similarly, Khan (2013) argues that 9/11 
made a radical shift and major changes in the US foreign policy towards the Middle East and 
Palestine, through giving examples. For example, before 9/11, the US was busy protecting its 
national interests in the Middle East, including oil. This protection was through supporting 
authoritarian friends and allies of Washington in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, Khan 
(2013) emphasizes that after 9/11, the US decided to promote democracy, and change 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East to serve American national interests. Thus, the only 
concern for the US is protecting its national interests in the Middle East due to the circumstances 
(Khan, 2013).  
According to Rynhold (2015) US support for Israel increased after 9/11 because Israel 
had the right to defend itself against the Palestinian terror. In addition, the US supported the 
removal of Palestinian president Yasser Arafat because he was considered as a terrorist. 
Accordingly, Miller (2006) emphasizes that after 9/11, promoting democracy in Palestine 
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became a pre-condition to establish the Palestinian state. Before 9/11, the US supported the 
creation of an independent Palestinian state, and supported the Mitchell Report which was 
important to end the conflict and end illegal Israeli settlements (Miller, 2006). Thus, the US  
shifted from focusing on Israeli occupation to focus on internal Palestinian issues. While the US 
was trying to promote democracy in the Middle East, Abrams (2017) emphasizes that the US 
believes that democracy promotion is a dangerous luxury in the Middle East, because the so-
called ―democratic parties‖ are only democratic by name with no actions. 
 
1.7.2. US Foreign Policy as a Pre-Existing Policy after 9/11 
1.7.2.1. Continuation of Imperialism  
Others argue that the 9/11 attacks led to a continuation in American imperialist foreign 
policy. According to Porter (2006); Malley-Morrison et al. (2012), the US invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 reflects a continuation of imperial American foreign 
policy. Malley-Morrison et al. (2012) proves this point through citing the idea of Porter (2006) 
about ―Ideological Certainty‖; a belief dating from the 19th century that the US is unique and 
superior, and thus destined by God to expand its territory to fight evil and promote democracy. 
Similarly, Farwell (2006); Madden (2008), asserts that American imperialism reemerged during 
and after the Cold War. The US was able to build a new world order that served its national 
interests due to its military power. As a result, the US became a world police man. Vast military 
supremacy legitimized US regional expenditure and intervention in the Middle East, including 
the invasion of Iraq in 1991 and in 2003 to serve American national interests (Farwell, 2006; 
Madden, 2008). 
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The Bush doctrine reflects continuity in American foreign policy. According to Tsui 
(2016), the Bush doctrine was not a revolutionary doctrine because the preemptive use of 
military forces against terrorism, regime change, and the promotion of democracy in the Middle 
East were considered already by former American presidents before 9/11. Similarly, Yonah & 
Kraft (2008) emphasizes that countering terrorism was traced from previous American 
administrations; in the 1998‘s and the 1990‘s, President Reagan and President Clinton 
emphasized on the threat of terrorism and the necessity to utilize military force in countering 
terrorism conducted by non-sate actors and supported by state actors. Similarly, Tsui (2012) 
asserts that the Bush doctrine reflects continuity in the American-led War on Terror.  
Yonah & Kraft, 2008 and Prifti, 2017 argue that the Bush administration was similar to 
the administrations of Reagan and Clinton in terms of the war on international terrorism 
conducted by non-state actors and supported by state-actors. Further, US foreign policy after 
9/11 did not change from that of pre-9/11 in terms of maintaining US hegemony and using 
unilateralism. That is because America‘s global status as the only hegemon in the region did not 
change, and thus its objectives and strategies did not change as in turn (Prifti, 2017).   
 
1.8. Study Limitations 
This study will be limited to Palestine, and to the George W. Bush‘s administration in the 
aftermath of 9/11.   
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1.9. Thesis Outline 
The main purpose of this thesis was to examine how US foreign policy towards Palestine 
after 9/11 changed if at all. This thesis will explore the usefulness of adopting a realist 
perspective to explain US foreign policy, with a focus on the impact of 9/11 on the Bush 
administration‘s decision to recognize the Palestinian state. Chapter Two will include the 
theoretical background that aims to summarize previous research on US foreign policy towards 
the Middle East and Palestine before and after 9/11. Finally, this chapter will introduce the 
theoretical frameworks that reflect US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11, including 
realism, and neo-conservatism. Chapter Three will define the main determinants of US foreign 
policy and discuss the decision making process towards Palestine before 9/11, how foreign 
policy decisions are being made in the US, and by whom. It will provide a clear understanding of 
the main factors that affect the decision making process towards Palestine before 9/11, and 
explain the justifications of decisions taken by policy-makers. Chapter Four will define the 
main determinants of US foreign policy and discuss the decision making process towards 
Palestine after 9/11, how foreign policy decisions are being made in the US, and by whom. It 
will provide a clear understanding of the main factors that affect the decision making process 
towards Palestine after 9/11, and explain the justifications of decisions taken by policy-makers. 
Chapter Five will analyze the reasons behind the Bush administration‘s decision to offer 
recognition to an independent Palestinian state. It will discuss under what conditions would a 
strategic and ―realist‖ American foreign policy elite make such a substantial change in policy 
that on its surface appears so favorable to Palestinians. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
 THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework useful for understanding 
and explaining the US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11. This theoretical framework, 
based on the literature reviewed, should both explain the historical context of US foreign policy 
towards Palestine, and explain relevant international relations theory. This chapter will be 
divided into three parts: an overview of international relations theories, an overview of the 
historical roots of US foreign policy towards Palestine, and finally a description of the 
implementation of US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11 within a theoretical 
framework.   
 
2.1. Theories of International Relations 
Theories of International Relations are important because they promise to explain how 
the world works. These theories allow us to understand the complexity of world politics and 
simplify it through studying the behavior of states and the relations between them under certain 
conditions and circumstances, including anarchy, as they seek to serve their national interests 
within the international system (Lawson, 2013). This section summarizes four theories.  
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Realism   
For realism, internationally-oriented human beings are evil and selfish, and are driven by 
their national interests (McGlinchey, 2017). Realists consider the world in anarchy made of 
states with no world government. States act rationally and compete with each other to survive 
and safeguard their national interests in a dangerous world (Burchill, 2005). For realism, the state 
is the main actor and thus power and national security are its main goals (Nicholson, 2002). 
States should use their unique military and economic powers to reshape the world order 
(Slaughter, 2011). Realism also has a contemporary version called Neo-Realism, which 
emphasizes that human nature is not the reason behind states‘ desire for power and dominance, 
but the absence of world government (Baylis, 2017). Further, neo-realists emphasize that states 
do their best to maximize their power against being threatened or attacked (Lawson, 2013).   
There are important differences between neo-realists. On one hand, defensive realists like 
Kenneth Waltz (1979) emphasize that states should not always try to maximize their power to 
achieve security and survival because this can affect them negatively (Mearsheimer, 2007). 
Further, Waltz emphasizes that the balance of power and cooperation between major states are 
the best ways to achieve security and survival for all (Mearsheimer, 2007). In addition, Waltz 
emphasizes that the foreign policy of a state does not affect the international system (Prifti, 
2017). On the other hand, offensive realists like John Mearsheimer (2001) emphasize that states 
should maximize their power and should pursue hegemony to achieve security and survival 
(Mearsheimer, 2007). Thus, military capability is the most important priority for great powers 
because it determines their place in the international system. Great powers are able to affect the 
international system and determine how it should operate according to their national interests, 
actions, and decisions. Mearsheimer emphasizes that since nations operate within an anarchic 
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system so states are rational actors and do their best to maximize their power against being 
threatened or attacked (ibid). Offensive realists believe that great powers are rational actors 
which prioritize their national interests, including security and survival over other needs and 
objectives (ibid).  
 
Liberalism 
McGlinchey (2017) argues that within a liberal framework, human beings are 
fundamentally good. (McGlinchey, 2017). Liberals emphasize that while war is an expected 
result, it should be the last option for states (Watson, 2012). Thus, shared liberal values between 
states, including cooperation and multilateralism, international law, free trade, democracy and 
human rights, should lead to peace rather than violence and war. Liberals emphasize that 
democratic states do not often fight each other, but they fight non-democratic states to maintain 
peace and security, according to democratic peace theory (Lyne, 1994). Liberalism emphasizes 
that international institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations are key 
actors in international relations because they collect multiple states, and can often prevent states 
from being selfish and thus encourage cooperation toward the common good (Walt, 1998). 
Liberalism has two contemporary approaches, Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, 
and Liberal Internationalism.  
Neo-Liberalism believes that democracy, interdependence, relatively free markets, 
international law, and international organizations can lead to lasting peace and security through 
institutions like the United Nations (Khanna, 2016). For neo-liberalism, states are the main 
actors, but not the only ones since other actors, include non-state actors (Lasan, 2012). Lawson 
14 
 
(2013) emphasizes that for neo-liberals, the world is anarchy, and states are rational and their 
behaviors are driven by their national interests. Thus, under this anarchy system, states should 
cooperate to survive (Lawson, 2013). 
 Hoffmann (1995) argues that Liberal Internationalism aims to spread democracy all 
around the world to maintain peace, security, and stability (Hoffmann, 1995, 159). This means 
that liberal internationalism is an approach to international relations that cares about promoting 
democracy and human rights globally. Further, liberal internationalism considers that 
humanitarian intervention by all means, including military force, sometimes is necessary for the 
good of humanity (Hehir, 2013).   
 
Constructivism 
Walt (1998) argues that for constructivism, international politics or international relations 
are shaped by the social construction of states, as opposed to their behaviors, rational choices, 
and selfish interests (Walt, 1998, 40). Ideas, norms, and identities have significantly influence 
states‘ interests and interactions with each other. Further, Slaughter (2011) states that for 
constructivists, military force, free trade and international institutions are shaped by social 
identities, beliefs and ideologies (Slaughter, 2011). Thus, international relations are constructed 
by social groups (Lawson, 2013).  
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Conservatism 
For conservatism, power is an important national interest that states seek (Rathbun, 2008, 
273). Conservatives thus consider relations between states immoral, because they are driven by 
power. Further, Rizer (2000) argues that for conservatives, war is unavoidable because it is an 
important instrument for serving national interests (Rizer, 2000). Conservatism has an important 
contemporary approach, Neo-Conservatism.  
Middup (2006) emphasizes that for neoconservatives, America‘s military, political and 
economic power is a force for good in the world (Middup, 2006). Neo-conservatism aims to 
increase US hegemony in the Middle East (Davis, 2008). Neoconservatives are strong supporters 
of Israel, and dubious about Arab intentions (Steinfels, 2013). For neo-conservatives, national 
interests are material, including military force. And neo-conservatives emphasize on the role of 
power in international relations (Rathbun, 2008). Further, neo-conservatives consider 
international institutions as dangerous (ibid). Further, Worley (2012) argues that neo-
conservatism believes in the use of force to spread democracy across the globe (Worley, 2012). 
Neo-Conservatives are against multilateralism and the international institutions, and favor 
unilateralism (Rathbun, 2008). In addition, neo-conservatives are nationalists and they call for 
national pride and greatness. They believe in the greatness of the nation (ibid). Further, neo-
conservatives believe that the national interests of the state are not different than that of the 
international community. Thus, state hegemony is good for the world (ibid).  
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2.2. Historical Roots of US Foreign Policy towards Palestine 
In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the international system was multipolar between 
great powers, including the United States. The US tended to see itself as unique and exceptional, 
and that it had a mission from God to serve humanity through democracy and moral values. 
Thus, it had practiced a policy of isolationism apart from other nations so it did not have an 
effective role in the Middle East. America‘s ―God mission‖ shaped US foreign policy towards 
Palestine. As Christion (2001) said: ―US sights fastened on Palestine – the Holy Land, the land 
of the Bible – as the place where Christianity and the ancient kingdom of Israel must be restored 
and repossessed from Muslim intruders (Christion, 2001, 19). The significance of the holy land 
for Western Christians, made Arabs and especially Palestinians as aliens in their own land. The 
American interest in Palestine was within an orientalist framework in which Palestine was a 
biblical and a holy land, to be reclaimed by Christians and Jews. Thus indigenous Palestinian 
Arabs were either non-existent, or barbarians, violent and unimportant (Christison, 2001). US 
foreign policy was therefore always biased in favor of Israel, and against Palestinians, because it 
has always been rooted in a Christian worldview.   
After World War I, Woodrow Wilson was the first American president to make a 
political decision on Palestine and support Zionism publically. His faith and beliefs influenced 
his policies. Christison (2001) argues that Wilson considered the Jewish return to Palestine as a 
fulfillment of biblical prophecies, and compatible with America‘s God mission (Christison, 
2001). Azar (2011) emphasizes that Wilson‘s biblical beliefs led him to support Britain‘s 1917 
Balfour Declaration which promised to establish a Jewish home land in Palestine, and denied the 
existence of the Palestinian people, in spite of the King-Crane Commission recommendations 
which said that the Zionist program would be a gross violation of the Palestinian people‘s right 
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to self-determination (Azar, 2011). Thus, Wilson extended concept of self-determination to many 
people, but denied its applicability to many indigenous populations controlled by colonial 
powers, including the Palestinians.  
Wilson‘s successors, including Franklin Roosevelt followed the same foreign policy in 
ignoring the existence of Palestinians in Palestine. Al Wadiyyeh (2009) argues that the period 
between the two World Wars from 1917 to 1945 was a period of American support for Zionism, 
not an effective commitment; the US took over Britain‘s role in supporting Zionism (Al 
Wadiyyeh, 2009). The US continued to see Palestine as a biblical land that is more appropriate 
for Jews than Arabs. Further, Hahn (2006) argues that Americans looked down on Muslims and 
Arabs and predicted that Jews would make Palestine prosper (Hahn, 2006). Zionist pressure was 
strong enough to gain American sympathy for Jews and thus helped drive US foreign policy and 
American public opinion toward favoring the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine to 
save Jews from the Holocaust. America‘s leaders were completely ignorant about the Palestinian 
situation. Christison (1997) also argues that Americans understood the Arab-Israeli conflict from 
a Zionist perspective (Christison, 1997).  
 
The Cold War Era: The Evolution of American Hegemony  
  After the end of World War II, the US emerged as a hegemonic power beside the Soviet 
Union as the international system became a bipolar system. The strategic importance and oil 
resources of the Middle East attracted both powers and thus became one of the major theaters of 
the Cold War (Sayigh, 1997). Both superpowers competed to control the Middle East‘s 
resources. During the Cold War, the US had many national interests in the Middle East, 
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including ensuring US access to oil resources, containing Soviet expansion, and ensuring the 
security of Israel (Schmaglowski, 2007).  
The US considered Israel its close strategic ally and its tool in protecting American 
national interests in the region, including containing Soviet expansion. Therefore, Saleh (2009) 
argues that President Harry Truman worked hard to promote Israel through calling upon Britain 
to allow the immigration of 100,000 Jewish immigrants to Palestine (Saleh, 2009). In addition, 
Truman supported the UN Partition Plan in 1947, and recognized Israel as a state eleven minutes 
after its formal declaration in 1948, in spite of the State Department‘s objection (Halabi, 2016). 
Following the creation of the state of Israel, American officials did not consider Palestinians as 
an independent nation, but as a refugee problem (Bustami, 1990). Since that time, the Palestine-
Israeli conflict continued to be significant in the Middle East policies of the US. The Cold War 
era can be divided into two periods:  
1948 - 1967 
Since its establishment in 1948, Israel was the most important strategic ally of the US, 
especially given the support the Soviet Union extended to Arab states in the region. Thus, the US 
supported Israel in all aspects, including economic and military support. Yaqub (2004) argues 
that this followed from Israel serving as a defender of American national interests in the Middle 
East, including containing Arab nationalists who were considered a puppet of the Soviets in the 
region (Yaqub, 2004). US support for Israel strengthened in 1967 after Israel‘s victory in the Six 
Days War against its Arab neighbors supported by the Soviet Union (Karakoulaki, 2013).  
US foreign policy centered on the Israeli perspective and thus ignored the Palestinian 
perspective. Abu-Lughod (1990) argues that the US tended to deal with states, such as Arab 
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states, and thus Palestinians were outside of US policy consideration. Palestinians were seen as a 
refugee problem, people who needs to be settled and compensated, but not returned (Abu-
Lughod, 1990). Further, Hilal (2007) emphasizes that while US presidents might have supported 
the right of return for Palestinian refugees, their pro-Israeli ideology, as well as Zionist pressure 
prevented them from adopting this Palestinian claim (Hilal, 2007). Further, the US considered 
the question of Palestine as one aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but not the core one.  
None of US presidents from Truman to Johnson were able to solve the conflict and push 
for peace through implementing UN Resolutions 194 and 181 (Azar, 2011). The US continued to 
refuse the recognition of Palestinian political rights, including the right to self-determination. No 
attention was paid to the Palestinians; they were seen as nonexistent. Khader (2005) argues that 
after the 1967 war, UN Security Council 242 was managed by the Johnson administration in 
favor of Israel; it did not force Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, but it forced the 
Arab countries to recognize Israel‘s right to exist (Khader, 2005). For Johnson, Israel should be 
compelled to withdraw from the Occupied Territories only for a peaceful settlement. Azar (2011) 
argues that the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 led the US to 
consider it as a terrorist group that fights Israel and threatens the US principle of stability in the 
Middle East (Azar, 2011).  
1967 - 1991  
Since the Six Day War in 1967, American foreign policy in the Middle East grew 
increasingly Israeli centered. Silverburg (1993) argues that the US was hostile to the PLO 
because it was a Palestinian nationalist movement. The US has combated all Third World 
nationalist movements because it affected American strategic interests in the Middle East 
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(Silverburg, 1993). Aruri (1989) emphasizes that all US administrations from Johnson to Bush I, 
supported UN Resolution 242 as the cornerstone for a proper settlement (Aruri, 1989). However, 
none of them was able to force Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories and return the 
land to Palestinians. Actually, this final settlement of the conflict would not consider Israel as a 
state that violated Palestinian rights, including the right to self-determination in the West Bank 
and Gaza (Aruri, 1989).  
Schmaglowski (2007) argues that the peace process was consistently weakened because 
the US shielded Israel from international scrutiny and thus Israel was able to refuse all peace 
initiatives, including Roger‘s Plan in 1969 and Shultz‘s Plan in 1988, suggested by the US and 
which called for Israel‘s withdrawal from the Occupied Territories (Schmaglowski, 2007). By 
doing so, the US encouraged Israel to retain the Occupied Territories, and ignored the Palestinian 
right to self-determination. Moreover, Neff (1995) argues that Israel refused the participation of 
the PLO in the peace process as a political factor, and it asked that Palestinian delegations 
appointed by Israel to be part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The US agreed to 
exclude the PLO from the peace process, including the Madrid Conference in 1991. Thus, 
Palestinians participated in the peace process as an integral part of the Jordanian delegation, and 
not as a separate part (Neff, 1995). 
 Further, Borgan (1989) emphasizes that the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
promised Israel that the US  would refuse to negotiate with the PLO unless they were to 
recognize Israel‘s existence, and recognize the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 (Brogan, 1989). 
Chomsky (1991) argues that by rejecting negotiations with the PLO, the US denied Palestinians 
the right to choose their political representatives (Chomsky, 1991). The political settlement of 
the Palestine-Israeli conflict thus became intertwined with the US-Israeli ―special relationship‖ 
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which counter balanced the threat of the Soviet Union. Thus, the US-Israeli special relationship 
undermined Palestinian rights and national aspirations. Aruri (1989) argues that the American 
Jewish community as well as American public opinion favored Israel against Palestinian claims 
(Aruri, 1989).  
 
Post-Cold War Era: America as a Global Hegemonic Power 
After the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the only super-power in the world. The 
international system shifted from bipolar to unipolar. This means that the US became the only 
hegemonic power that could hope to unilaterally implement policies in this new world order. 
Feldman (1996) argues that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to 
an increase in US-Israeli strategic cooperation, even though their primary motivations for 
strategic cooperation had ended, namely containing Soviet expansion and detering the Arab 
nationalist awakening (Feldman, 1996). The absence of a competing hegemonic power has given 
the US an upper hand in managing the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Chomsky (1994) argues that the 
unipolarity of the US at the global and the regional levels allowed it to pursue various policies to 
resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the new world order (Chomsky, 1994). Morra (2016) 
argues that the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Accords in 1993 were direct results of 
America‘s new global standing (Morra, 2016).  
Bishara (2002) emphasizes that the Oslo Accords sponsored by the US in 1993 was a 
cover for Israel to grab more Palestinian lands (Bishara, 2002, 90). Thus, under the Clinton 
administration, the US held the most anti-Palestinian positions regarding sensitive issues, 
including Israeli settlements, the annexation of Jerusalem, and the refugee problem, because they 
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were accepted, and not considered illegal (Bishara, 2002). Further, Mattar (2005) argues that 
Clinton was the most pro-Israeli president in American history. Instead of pressing for the end of 
Israeli occupations and settlements, the Clinton administration allowed Israel to withdraw from 
the negotiations without the implementation of redeployments called for in the Oslo Accords 
(Mattar, 2005).  
Moreover, Azar (2011) argues that the misunderstanding of the Palestinian cause at the 
negotiating table by the Clinton administration led to the failure of the Oslo Accords in 1993 
(Azar, 2011). In addition, Mattar (2005) argues that the Clinton administration‘s failure to halt 
the steady expansion of Israeli control over the Occupied Territories led to the failure of the 
Camp David Summit in 2000 (Mattar, 2005). Moreover, Clinton blamed Arafat and the 
Palestinians for the failure of the peace process. In addition, Mearsheimer (2008) argues that the 
Clinton administration supported Israel unconditionally through protecting the Jewish state from 
criticism at the United Nations, and giving it the largest part of American foreign aid 
(Mearsheimer, 2008).  
Since the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority 
in 1994 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the US began providing financial aid to the 
Palestinians (Zanotti, 2010). The US was the largest donor of financial aid to the Palestinians and 
the US government had given more than $5 billion to the Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza.US aid reaches Palestinians through: USAID, Budget Support for the PA, and UNRWA. 
This aid aimed to prevent terrorism against Israel, maintain peaceful co-existence with Israel, 
and serve humanitarian needs (Zanotti, 2010). The Palestinian Authority was in turn bound by 
these purposes, and any loss of commitment would lead to a cut in US aid. 
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Post 9/11 Era: American Unilateralism   
Since the end of the Cold War, the US became the only superpower in the international 
order in all aspects, including political, economy and military dimensions. Thus, US hegemony 
was seen as invincible. However, Rathnayake (2016) states that the 9/11 attacks affected 
American supremacy (Rathnayake, 2016). Further, Debin (2012) likewise argues that the 9/11 
attacks posed a serious threat to American hegemony in the international order. The US wanted 
to reassert its superior military power through launching the War on Terror (Krauthammer, 
2002).  
Daalder (2003) states that under the Bush administration, US foreign policy shifted from 
multilateralism to unilateralism to maintain American hegemony in the international order 
through acting to safeguard its national interests (Daalder, 2003). The US implemented foreign 
policies to maintain its hegemony and safeguard its national interests in the Middle East. 
Democracy promotion was part of US foreign policy against terrorism to maintain American 
hegemony in the region. The holy land had become part of the global war on terror (Halabi, 
2016). Mohamad (2015) argues that for the Bush administration, democracy promotion in the 
Middle East was a precondition for establishing Palestinian statehood (Mohamad, 2015). This 
means that in order to establish a Palestinian statehood, the Arab region as well as the Palestinian 
people would need to fight terrorism and meet certain standards of tolerance towards Israel.  
Halabi (2016); Mohamad (2015) argue that George W. Bush was the first American 
president to recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination and to have an independent state 
alongside Israel (Halabi, 2016; Mohamad, 2015). For Bush, Arafat was a member of the axis of 
evil and no peace could be reached with him (Zoughbie, 2014). Thus, Bush asked the Palestinian 
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people to renounce terrorism and elect a new Palestinian leadership to gain their right to self-
determination because terrorism was in Bush‘s mind the reason behind depriving Palestinians of 
their right to self-determination, not the Israeli occupation. The US supported free and fair 
elections in Palestine through allowing Islamic groups like Hamas to participate (Sharp, 2006). 
The Bush administration was however unfair towards Palestinians; it focused on asking 
Palestinians to reform their PA, elect a new leadership and ―denounce terrorism‖ in favor of 
Israel‘s security demands, while covering Israel‘s use of force to defend itself in the Occupied 
Territories (Halabi, 2016; Mohamad, 2015). Bush considered Israel‘s conflict with the 
Palestinians during the Second Intifada to be similar to the US conflict with Islamic terrorism. 
Thus, the Bush administration backed Israel‘s unilateral actions in the Palestinian territories 
which involved unprecedented force (Mohamad, 2015).  
Mohamad (2015) argues that after the election victory of Hamas in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, the Bush administration did not accept Palestinians‘ electoral choices due 
to Israel‘s rejection (Mohamad, 2015). This raised doubts about US impartiality and its effect on 
the peace process and democratization. Further, Gordon (2014) emphasizes that after the election 
victory of Hamas in 2006, the US decided to cut its direct aid to the Palestinian Authority. It 
restored the aid when Abbas expelled Hamas out of the shared government. It was a penalization 
for the Palestinians because they did not chose leaders that were acceptable for Israel and the US. 
In addition, Rose (2014) argues that Hamas‘ victory in 2006 was also used as an excuse for 
Israel‘s unilateralism against the Palestinians (Rose, 2014). 
Mohamad (2015) argues that Bush failed to solve the Palestine-Israeli conflict through 
his two state plan and the Road Map because they failed to provide details about final status 
issues, including Jerusalem, the Refugee Problem, and the Settlements (Mohamad, 2015). In 
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addition, Veliotes (2002) argues that the Bush plan was a one sided vision; it asked everything 
from the Palestinian government, but asked nothing from the Israeli government (Veliotes, 
2002). US foreign policy was thus contradictory towards Palestine after 9/11.  
 
2.3. Application of Theory on the Study 
As mentioned above, the US implemented a multifaceted policy to counter terrorism and 
maintain its hegemonic status in the Middle East after 9/11. Palestine had become enveloped in 
this War on Terror. The US asked the Palestinians to reform the PA, elect a new leadership and 
counter terrorism to gain statehood. However, it asked nothing from the Israeli government. The 
spread of democracy was the main goal of US foreign policy towards Palestine to counter 
terrorism, thus American officials demanded certain standards of tolerance towards Israel.  
These foreign policies are compatible with the expectations of the theory of Neo-
Conservatism. This theory emphasizes that America‘s military, political and economic power is a 
force for good in the world (Middup, 2006). This was reflected in the US foreign policy through 
using military force to spread democracy and counter terrorism in the Middle East. The US gave 
Israel a free hand in dealing with the Palestinians because both states believed they were 
threatened by terrorism. Neo-conservatism aims to increase US hegemony in the Middle East 
(Davis, 2008). The US implemented regime changes in the Middle East and pushed democratic 
reforms on the Palestinian Authority in favor of Israel‘s security. Further, Neoconservatives are 
strong supporters of Israel, dubious about Arab intentions (Steinfels, 2013). This was reflected in 
US foreign policy through Bush‘s pro-Israel policy. He gave Israel all the freedom it needed to 
counter Palestinian violence.   
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This chapter has attempted to analyze US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11 
from a theoretical perspective. It was divided into three parts: an overview of international 
relations theories, an overview of the historical roots of US foreign policy towards Palestine, and 
finally a description of the implementation of US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11 
within a theoretical framework. It aimed to summarize previous research on US foreign policy 
towards Palestine before and after 9/11 from a theoretical approach.  
The next chapter will define the main determinants of US foreign policy and discuss the 
decision making process towards Palestine before 9/11. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
 DETERMINANTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE 9/11 
This chapter defines the main determinants of US foreign policy and discusses the 
decision making process towards Palestine before 9/11, how foreign policy decisions are being 
made in the US, and by whom. This chapter will provide a clear understanding of the main 
factors that affect the decision making process towards Palestine before 9/11, and explain the 
justifications of decisions taken by policy-makers towards Palestine.  
US foreign policy is very complex because it is shaped by both domestic and 
international factors, and it is thus not made in a vacuum. Numerous actors inside and outside the 
state work to affect it. These determinants shape US foreign policy toward the Middle East in 
general and Palestine in particular. The following is an overview of international and domestic 
determinants before 9/11.  
 
3.1. International Determinants 
Different international determinants shaped US foreign policy towards Palestine before 
9/11, including the structure of the international system, and national interests. The following is 
an overview of international determinants that played a significant role. 
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3.1.1. The Structure of the International System 
In realist theory, the main feature of the international system is anarchism. Each state 
struggles to survive. The structure of the international system shapes a country‘s foreign policy. 
The U.S. is no exception (Ambrosio, 2017, 3). The U.S. has always struggled to maintain its 
hegemonic status in the Middle East to serve American national interests. During the Cold War, 
the structure of international system was bipolar in which the US and the Soviet Union were the 
world‘s superpowers (Ward, 2006, iii). The Middle East was a primary strategic area of 
competition between the both sides in large part due to oil reserves and the geographic centrality 
of the region. The question of Palestine was subordinate to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
Palestinians were unimportant. However, Israel was a strategic ally in the containment of 
communism in the region. As Karakoulaki (2013) said: ―In addition, Israel was considered one 
of the most important allies and strategic assets to the USA during the Cold War, especially since 
its neighboring Arab States had the support of the Soviet Union‖ (Karakoulaki, 2013, 6). Israel 
was necessary to safeguard America‘s national interests in the region.  
After the end of the Cold War and the failure of the Soviet Union, the U.S. became the 
only superpower in the world. The structure of international system was transformed into a 
unipolar system. As Gordon (2014) said: ―the United States finds itself at the apex of the 
international system, possessing the ability to project its power and influence throughout the 
world in an unrivaled manner‖ (Gordon, 2014, 3). This unipolar moment allowed the U.S. to 
pursue different foreign policies to stabilize the Middle East, and push forward the Palestine-
Israeli peace process. The Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords were direct results of 
America‘s New World Order (Morra, 2016, 64). The unipolar world facilitated the Palestine-
Israeli peace process. The special relationship between the US and Israel continued to be a 
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cornerstone of America‘s foreign policy. As a result, US foreign policy was biased to Israel. 
Further, the Palestine-Israeli peace process was set as Israel saw fit. Palestinians were blamed for 
the failure of the peace process (Al-Rousan, 2013, 206).  
 
3.1.2. National Interests 
The U.S. has long been involved in the Middle East to protect its national interests. U.S. 
foreign policy was designed to advance those national interests in the region. Several national 
interests shaped U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine before 9/11, including securing strategic 
access to oil, ensuring the security of Israel, containing communism, and resisting Islamic 
fundamentalism.  
 
3.1.2.1. Access to Oil    
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. became highly dependent on Middle Eastern oil. 
Ensuring stability to secure access to cheap oil and prevent any hostile state from controlling it 
became a primary interest of the U.S. in the region. As Al Sarhan (2017) said: ―The Middle East 
was very attractive to both the United States government and American petroleum companies 
due to its proven long-term oil reserves‖ (Al Sarhan, 2017, 460). This means that access to Arab 
oil is the cornerstone of U.S. Middle East foreign policy. To pursue this interest in a realist 
framework, the U.S. should pursue regional stability at the expense of human rights. An Israel 
that feels unsecure and without any major ally might act in a way that harms America‘s interests, 
especially access to oil in the region (Waxer, 2013, 33). Thus, unlimited support for Israel is 
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economically and militarily justified. The special relationship between the U.S. and Israel helps 
in U.S. access to cheap oil. 
American access to Arab oil is linked to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the 1973 Oil 
Crisis, the Organization of Arab Petroleum imposed an embargo against the U.S. due to its 
support for Israel during the 1973 War (Worley, 2015, 148). This had a direct impact on the U.S. 
economy. Thus, the US realized the importance of solving the Palestinian question to protect 
American national interests, especially oil in the Gulf region. This shows that Arabs used oil as a 
strategic and political weapon against America‘s support of Israel. The U.S. goal of stability was 
threatened by the Arab oil boycott of 1973. The US wanted to stabilize its relations with Arabs 
by pushing forward the peace process to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. efforts to 
promote peace in the region could not be taken for granted. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter 
succeeded in leading the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. These peaceful 
negotiations were in Israel‘s interests (Quandt, 2011, 334).  
After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. wanted to ensure stability in the Middle East 
through promoting a peace process. Thus, solving the Palestine-Israeli conflict became a central 
component of U.S. Middle East foreign policy. That was because ―the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
has historically caused many crises and wars, resolving this conflict would lessen the risk of 
interrupted oil flows from the Middle East‖ (Adam, 2015, 10). This shows that solving the 
Palestine-Israeli conflict would promote stability in the region and protect American national 
interests, especially access to cheap oil. However, with the end of the Cold War and the failure of 
the Soviet Union, the US became the only superpower globally and regionally. Israel became a 
strategic ally, while the Arabs, especially Palestinians, became weaker because they lost a 
political and military ally, the Soviet Union. Therefore, Arabs were not able to oppose the U.S.-
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led peace process. As Morra (2016) said: ―In essence, the collapse of the Soviet Union, which 
marked the end of the Cold War led to a shift in the balance of power both at the international 
and regional levels as well as changes in the rules of how the game was played‖ (Morra, 2016, 
64). US-led peace talks, including the Madrid Conference of 1991, and the Oslo Accords of 
1993, were all in Israel‘s interest.  
3.1.2.2. Security of Israel 
Since its establishment, Israel was a U.S. priority. Israel and the U.S. are bound by shared 
historic and cultural ties as well as by shared interests. Israel serves as a strategic ally to 
safeguard America‘s national interests in the Middle East. There is a deep commitment by U.S. 
policymakers to Israel‘s security. As President Jimmy Carter in a press conference said: ―We 
have a special relationship with Israel. It‘s absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around 
the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right 
of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace‖ (Carter, 1977). This special 
relationship between the U.S. and Israel is reflected in a commonwealth of shared interests. 
Further, the U.S. foreign aid to Israel is the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the region. 
Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid (Sharp, 2010). The strength of this 
relationship has fueled hatred toward the U.S. in the region. 
Israel is America‘s most reliable friend in the Middle East. That is because America‘s 
national interests are best served by Israel. Thus, the nature of America‘s special relationship 
with Israel affects U.S. foreign policy toward the Palestine-Israeli conflict. As Christison (2001) 
said: ―In a frame of reference that so enthusiastically envelops Israel and so automatically 
approaches the conflict from the Israeli point of view, there has been little room for the 
Palestinian perspective‖ (Christison, 2001, 3). This means that support for Israel has been the 
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cornerstone of America‘s foreign policy towards the Middle East, especially the Palestine-Israeli 
conflict.  
During the Cold War, Israel was a strategic ally for the U.S. through containing the 
Soviet threat in the region. America‘s top priority was to protect Israel. For the US, a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was based on resolutions 242 and 338  
which call for the exchange of ―land for peace‖ with an emphasis on Israel‘s security. Neither 
Palestinians, nor their right to self-determination over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, were 
mentioned (Anziska, 2013, 17). The U.S. failed to pressure Israel to withdraw from the Occupied 
Territories. After the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was the most biased to Israel. That 
was due to the US-Israeli special relationship. The Clinton administration was the most biased, 
especially in making Israel the only winning side in the peace process. As Al-Rousan (2013) 
said: ―President Clinton represented a distinctive mark in the American-Israeli relation as being 
the most biased presidents in the accomplishment of the Israeli aims by pushing the Palestinian 
and Jordanian parties to work as Israel liked in regard to common economic, security and 
political arrangements‖ (Al-Rousan, 2013, 199). The Clinton administration looked at the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict through an Israeli lens. Thus, the US-led peace process, and the 
sponsorship of the Oslo Accords of 1993 reflect the pro-Israel bias in the Clinton‘s 
administration through serving Israeli aims.  
 
3.1.2.3. The Containment of Communism 
After World War II, the US defined itself as the ―leader of the free world‖ against Soviet 
communism. The US was responsible for ensuring freedom, democracy and peace in the world. 
33 
 
As Patterson said: ―many American foreign policy experts perceived the struggle between 
communists and capitalists as an existential battle between forces of good and evil.‖ (Patterson, 
2018, 22). This battle against the spread of communism reflected ―unshakable conviction‖ in 
American exceptionalism. The US, as the chosen nation must save humanity and protect the free 
and democratic nations from the evils of communism. American exceptionalism became a 
weapon to counter communism in the world. The policy of containment was defined in the 
Truman Doctrine and was adopted by successive American administrations during the Cold War 
era. According to Leonard (2013), the policy of containment included many American 
initiatives. For example, the Marshall Plan (1947), which was designed to revive European 
economies with American money and way of life. Similarly, the US intervened in other nation‘s 
affairs through the ―modernization‖ theory, which emphasized that the US could help 
underdeveloped country to move from ―traditional‖ to ―modern.‖ (Leonard, 2013, 1104). These 
American initiatives were justified with the desire to ensure international security.  
The United States and its allies competed with the Soviet Union and its allies 
economically, military, and ideological. The primary goal of American foreign policy was to 
prevent the Soviet Union from becoming a regional hegemon and disturbing the balance of 
power. Ensuring stability was the fundamental objective of US foreign policy to protect the 
national interests especially in the Middle East. Accordingly, Hahn (2005) said: ―As a result, the 
United States began practicing a fundamental policy of anticommunist containment that 
remained a bedrock objective through the remainder of the Cold War‖ (Hahn, 2011).  The 
competition between the world‘s superpowers introduced American direct involvement in the 
region‘s affairs. The US strategies to counter communism through the Baghdad Pact or Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955, which was a pro-Western alliance between countries, 
34 
 
including the US, the UK, Iraq, Iran and Turkey. These countries were asked to cooperate for 
their security against the rising influence of Soviet communism and Arab nationalism. The US 
tried to contain Arab nationalism through the denial of economic and military aid. But, the US 
supported pro-West Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf and provided them with economic and 
military assistance to maintain American national interests, including ensuring access to oil, and 
countering communism. According to Al Sarhan (2017), this client-relationship allowed the US 
to maintain easy access to oil and establish more military bases in the region (Al Sarhan, 2017, 
467). The US was prepared to provide any Middle Eastern country with economic and military 
aid against international communism. 
With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US foreign policy was pro-Israel. This 
bonding increased due to Cold War strategies. As major regional states, including Egypt was 
backed by the Soviets, Israel emerged as a strategic ally of the US. As Baxter & Akbarzadeh 
(2012) said: ―Although religious and cultural affinities are often a matter of focus, the Israel–US 
alliance can most constructively be understood as a byproduct of the Cold War‖ (Baxter & 
Akbarzadeh, 2012, 136). Since Israel‘s victory in the Six Day War in 1967, US officials realized 
that Israel could be the single most important ally in the region. Israel succeeded in suppressing 
radical Arab nationalists, and proving its military superiority over Arab military. Thus, the US 
was committed to Israel‘s security. No American administration from Eisenhower to Reagan 
succeeded in finding a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and recognizing the 
Palestinian right to self-determination. The American effort to solve the conflict was aimed at 
protecting Israel‘s interests, rather than achieving a comprehensive peace in the region. Finally, 
the Cold War ended with the collapse of Soviet communism in December 1991.  
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the only superpower in the world. 
The US foreign policy was no longer concerned with containing communism. As Cox & Stokes 
(2012) said that: ―With the collapse first of the Berlin Wall and subsequently Soviet communism 
itself, the United States stood in need of a new way of grounding its internationalist engagement‖ 
(Cox & Stokes, 2012, 82). With the disappearance of common enemy, the loyalty of US foreign 
allies in exchange of protection and security from the US was necessary. There was a hope that 
the anarchy of world order could be replaced by enduring peace and stability. The Clinton 
administration replaced the rhetoric of ―containment‖ by the rhetoric of ―engagement and 
enlargement,‖ and relied on the power of international institutions, such as the United Nations to 
promote peace, democracy and human rights worldwide. The world had become unipolar in 
economic, military, and ideological senses.    
 
3.1.2.4. Resisting Islamic Fundamentalism 
As the significance of communism declined after the end of the Cold War, greater 
attention has been paid to the rising of Islamic fundamentalism. The Western powers and 
especially the US, were concerned owing to the ideology of these extremist groups which is 
hostile to the West. As Karabell (1995) said: ―On one side, there is a belief that Islamic 
fundamentalism is the new communism and consequently must be opposed with whatever means 
are necessary to contain the fundamentalist threat‖ (Karabell, 1995, 37). Islamic fundamentalism 
has been regarded as dangerous as communism to the regional stability and American interests in 
the Middle East. This reflects a clash of civilization between Muslims and the West, as 
advocated by the theory of Huntington. Islamic fundamentalism views the capitalist world as an 
aggressive enemy. The rise of Islamism came from the assumption that Muslims weakness and 
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defeat in the face of the West was due to their ―turning away from God,‖ or ―deviating off the 
straight path of Islam.‖ As Davidson (2009) argued that the loss of God‘s favor is the result of 
the fascination and dependence upon the West (Davidson, 2009, 1).  
The explosion of terrorism in the Middle East was entangled with the Iranian revolution 
(1978-1979), which called for an active struggle based on Islamic cultural heritage, rather than 
the Western cultural heritage. For fundamentalists, American culture has polluted Islamic 
traditions and values. Thus, promoting extremism became the fundamental objective of the 
Iranian foreign policy against the US and Israel. Consequently, religiously inspired extremists 
spread across the Middle East. During the 1980s, ―US officials were calling the Middle East ―the 
crucible of terrorism,‖ and nearly half of recorded attacks occurred or originated in the region‖ 
(Brands, 2016, 232). US officials were dominated by fear of radical Islam. Iranian financial aid 
flowed to many Islamist fundamentalist organizations, including Hezbollah, and Hamas in the 
struggle against Israel. Pillar (2001) argues that Iran was responsible for the 1983 Beirut 
Barracks bombing attacks on the U.S. embassy (Pillar, 2001). For many in the West, Islam is the 
religion of hatred and violence. Al Sarhan (2017) argued that the US policy is dual; it provided 
the Taliban Islamic forces with economic and military aid about ―$4-5 billion during the years 
1980-1992‖ against the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Then, the US accused the Taliban 
regime of sheltering Al-Qaeda, and its leader Osama Bin Laden, and violating Women‘s rights 
(Al Sarhan, 2017, 467). The US used Islamic groups against the Soviet communism.  
Following the Oslo Accords (1993), in which the PLO and Israel recognized each other, 
the fundamentalists continued their struggle against the ―New World Order.‖ As Tibi (2002) 
argued that Palestinian fundamentalist Islamist organizations, such as Hamas and the Islamic 
Jihad committed violent actions in refusal of the peace process (Tibi, 2002). This opposition was 
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due to Hamas‘s ideology, which emphasizes on the ―Islamic essence‖ of the Palestine-Israeli 
conflict. For Hamas, it is a ―war of religion‖ between Islam and Judaism. Moreover, Hamas 
regards the struggle as a clash of civilization between Islam and the West. As Litvak (1998) said: 
―Both the capitalist West and the Communist East are regarded as one entity in this context 
because of their support for Zionism‖ ( Litvak, 1998, 150). For Hamas and other Islamic 
fundamentalist organizations, this is a struggle between good and evil.       
3.2. Domestic Determinants 
U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine, is shaped by different domestic determinants. 
These domestic determinants can be divided into two types: Formal Domestic Determinants and 
Informal Domestic Determinants.  
 
3.2.1. Formal Domestic Determinants 
The conduct of American foreign policy is regulated under the US Constitution through a 
system of checks and balances. The Constitution gives both the Executive branch (the President) 
and the Legislative branch (Congress) the power and the legal authority to make the US foreign 
policy (Grimmett, 1999, 1). The following is an overview of the important roles played both by 
the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch. 
 
3.2.1.1. The Executive Branch (The Institution of the Presidency)  
The Executive Branch is represented by the White House, which is composed of the 
President, Vice President, and the Cabinet which includes the Secretary of State, the National 
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Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that help the president in making his 
decisions. The presidency is the most important institution among other institutional actors in 
shaping US foreign policy (Oldemeinen, 2012).  
The President  
The American president is at the top of the political pyramid. He is the main architect of a 
foreign policy that is based on America‘s national interests in the world (Allison & Blackwill, 
2000, 2). The importance of the president‘s role in making foreign policy is derived from the 
powers that are given by Constitution. The Constitution states that: ―the President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.‖ (U.S Const. Art. II, § 2). The 
US president is thus primarily responsible for executive government as both the head of state and 
the head of government, and the commander of the US military. The US president has an 
unparalleled level of influence over US foreign policy. However, he is not an autonomous 
decision-maker (Robison, 2005, 1). He does not act alone, but consults with the Vice President, 
the White House Staff, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security 
Advisor and the Director of the CIA (Dumbrell, 1990, 48).   
While American foreign policy is usually based on national interests, domestic demands 
and influences also affect it. As Scholten (2017) said: ―In a perfect world, the decisions made in 
the field of foreign policy would be based on the nation‘s best interests in the context of 
geopolitics and economics. However, the world is not perfect, and therefore, presidents have to 
consider domestic demands when making foreign policy decisions‖ (Scholten, 2017, 14). 
Presidential decision-making can be affected by various domestic factors, including ideology, 
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religion, beliefs and culture, childhood experience, crisis, Congress, advisors and officials, 
media, public opinion and interest groups. Thus, each of these factors affects presidential 
decision-making process.  
Israel‘s security is a priority among American national interests in the Middle East, due 
to the ―special relationship‖ between Israel and the US. This special relationship has always been 
supported by the American leadership to varying degrees. As Cavari & Nyer (2016) said: ―Ever 
since the establishment of Israel, American leaders have demonstrated strong support for it —by 
securing military and economic aid; by intervening during military conflicts; by supporting 
Israel‘s interests on the international stage; and in binational relations during peace negotiations‖ 
(Cavari & Nyer, 2016, 9). Israel has become an overriding issue in American foreign policy; it is 
regularly invoked in party platforms and during presidential election seasons. The American 
political culture usually favors the Israeli perspective against the Palestinian perspective. As 
Christison (2001) said: ―Each has been influenced to one degree or another by a national mind-
set that is focused principally on Israel‖ (Christison, 2001, 287). The special relationship 
influences presidential decision-making process, and favors Israel at the expense of the 
Palestinian viewpoint.   
US presidents, subject to domestic political pressure, have shown their support for Israel 
through many policies. During the start of the Cold War, President Harry Truman recognized 
Israel eleven minutes after the proclamation of independence, in spite of the State Department‘s 
refusal. However, Truman was not aware of the Palestinians‘ real grievances. Truman‘s 
recognition of Israel was based on many factors, including his considerations that Israel would 
be a close strategic ally against Soviet expansion in the Middle East (Devine, 2008, 38). Further, 
Truman‘s recognition of Israel was based on his biblical beliefs that Jews should return to 
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Palestine and Arabs were unimportant and barbaric (Christison, 2002). For Truman, a Jewish 
presence seemed more fitting that an Arab presence in Palestine. Further, Truman‘s recognition 
of Israel was influenced by his Zionist friend and White House adviser, Clark Clifford, who also 
wanted to gain the votes of US Jews in the 1948 elections (Hahn, 2006, 26).  
After the end of the Cold War the US became the leader of the world and it gained the 
upper hand in managing the Palestine-Israeli conflict and the peace process. This peace process 
was a direct result of America‘s role in the new world order. President Bill Clinton was the most 
pro-Israeli president in American history (Mattar, 2005, 512). Clinton supported Israel through 
sponsoring the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the Camp David Summit in 2000. Clinton‘s main 
policy was to do nothing until Israel was ―ready.‖ Further, the Clinton administration changed 
the terms of reference for UN Resolution 242, including undermining the concept ―territories for 
peace,‖ and considering the territories to be ―disputed‖ not occupied, and arguing that Israel had 
the right to negotiate the retention of part of the territories. Further, Israeli settlements moved 
from being illegal and obstacles to peace under the Carter and the Reagan administrations into 
being mere complicating factors under the Clinton administration (Christison, 2001, 278).  
Moreover, Clinton supported Israel‘s illegal actions against Palestinians through 
preventing any kind of criticism against Israel in the United Nations, and giving Israel more aid 
than others (Mearsheimer, 2008, 147). Accordingly, Al-Rousan (2013) said: ―Clinton‘s policy 
always implied a biased stand for Israel. The moment it stated its sponsorship of the peace 
process, its real essence conformed, in principle and in practice, with Israeli policies 
contradicting international legitimacy‖ (Al-Rousan, 2013, 208). Clinton‘s policies and decisions, 
including the peace process, were excuses to support Israel in the region, ensure its superiority 
and security and safeguard its illegal expansion in the occupied territories.  
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On one hand, the Palestinians had closer ties with Clinton than any previous president, 
and they became a legitimate factor in US foreign policy. On the other hand, Clinton was not 
fully aware of the Palestinian‘s grievances. He was influenced by the American mindset and thus 
blamed the Palestinians for the collapse of the peace process (Christison, 2002). Further, 
Clinton‘s policies and decisions towards Palestine were influenced by a group of advisors and 
seniors who were partisans of Israel more than those found in any previous administration, 
including Vice President Albert Gore, Secretary of State Madeline Albright and a Senior Official 
in the National Security Council Martin Indyk (Neff, 1994, 20-23). They worked on keeping 
Israel strong while the peaceful negotiations continued. Further, Clinton was influenced by the 
liberal internationalist approach to the peace process (Rynhold, 2015, 80).  
 
3.2.1.2. The Legislative Branch  
The Legislative Branch is represented by the Congress. The following is an overview of 
the role of Congress in shaping US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11, and the factors 
that influence the decision-making process.  
Congress is the nation‘s legislative, or lawmaking body. It has two chambers: the House 
of Representatives and the Senate (McNeese, 2014, 42). Congress plays a role in framing US 
foreign policy through the powers that are granted by the Constitution. As Auerswald & 
Campbell (2012) said: ―Congress received the power to declare war, and military appropriations 
were limited to two years, to provide a check against militaristic legislators. The power of the 
purse, and authority to regulate foreign commerce, also were assigned to Congress‖ (Auerswald 
& Campbell, 2012, 19). This shows that Congress can influence foreign policy through declaring 
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war, passing laws and legislations, regulating foreign trade, controlling the budget and foreign 
aid.  
Although the President has more authority over foreign policy than Congress, it still plays 
an important role in affecting the foreign policy toward the Palestine-Israeli conflict through 
providing Israel with economic and military aid. This support is for many reasons, including 
Israel as a strategic ally to safeguard America‘s national interests in the region, the Jewish vote 
in congressional elections, and the pro-Israel‘s lobby pressure. On one hand, Congress supports 
the Palestinian Authority through aid appropriations. As Zanotti (2014) said: ―Since the signing 
of the Oslo Accord in 1993, Congress has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance 
to the Palestinians‖ (Zanotti, 2014, 1). This means that Congressional aid to the Palestinians can 
be used as a tool for a politically-motivated financial pressure for the Israelis‘ benefit. Congress 
has provided assistance to the Palestinian Authority and institutions, in order to ensure that Israel 
has a partner for peace. For several years, Congress has insisted that US aid to the Palestinians 
should be monitored to make sure that it is not going to terrorist groups (Sharp, 2006, 4). In 
1998, Congress acted to prohibit assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation, which 
has been benefiting from US aid while engaging in ―pro-violent‖ and ―hatred campaigns‖ against 
Israelis (Congress, U. S., 1998, 19322). After 9/11, Congress aid was a tool in the war on terror. 
In December 2001, Congress asked President Bush to suspend relations with the Palestinian 
Authority and its President Yasser Arafat unless he decided to renounce terrorism. Congress 
passed the Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill of 2002, which prohibited any aid funds to the 
Palestinian Authority unless it renounced terrorism, but also continued humanitarian aid to the 
Palestinians (Nowels, 2002, 11). Following the Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative 
Council elections, Congress and the Bush Administration decided to reduce US assistance to the 
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Palestinians. However, in 2007, Congress and the Bush Administration boosted US aid to the 
PA‘s security, governance and development offices following Hamas‘s takeover of Gaza, and 
President Mahmoud Abbas‘s dismissal of Hamas ministers from government (Zanotti, 2012, 6-
7).  
On the other hand, Congress continued its support for Israel economically and militarily 
regardless of its illegal actions against the Palestinians. Since 1976, Israel has been the largest 
recipient of US aid (Mark, 2005, 1). This is due to the US Congress‘s unlimited support for Israel 
through bills, resolutions and acts. As Cavari & Nyer (2016) said: ―Congress consistently 
supported appropriations bills to aid Israel economically and militarily, and passed resolutions in 
support of Israel even when this meant acting against the position of the administration‖ (Cavari 
& Nyer, 2016, 13). Congress works to maintain the special relationship between Israel and the 
US. Since 1967, Congress has consistently claimed that the US should recognize united 
Jerusalem as Israel‘s capital. For example, Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 
which mandated that the US embassy should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Every 
president until now, either Democratic or Republican, has adopted the position that the final 
status of Jerusalem should be determined by negotiations between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis (Berger, 2002, 124).  
Different factors affect the role of Congress in foreign policy-making towards Palestine. 
The most influential factor is the pro-Israeli Lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (AIPAC). As Peters & Newman (2013) said: ―It is undoubtedly the behemoth among 
pro-Israel groups, and it exerts a lot of influence in Congress-the bills supporting Israel that it 
drafts and/or promotes often receive almost unanimous support in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate‖ (Peters & Newman, 2013, 363). This means that AIPAC has an 
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unchallenged hold on the US Congress, and it can exert its influence on Democratic and 
Republican Congressmen. This is due to AIPAC‘s financial support for legislators and 
congressional candidates who support its agenda. Any members of Congress who do not fall into 
line will be threatened politically and financially (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 42).  
AIPAC is a source of information and it is often called upon to work on legislation, draft 
speeches, and provide advice on tactics (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 43). This means that 
AIPAC is pressuring on Congress to support Israel. In 1995, AIPAC backed a congressional bill 
to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (Young, 2014, 216).  
 
3.2.2. Informal Domestic Determinants  
The foreign policy of the United States is also influenced by non-governmental actors. As 
Shipoli (2018) said: ―These actors have not been governmentally established, so their main roles 
are in creating influence and pressure on the decision-makers‖ (Shipoli, 2018, 29). This means 
that informal determinants which operate outside the government help develop and promote 
American foreign policy. There are different non-governmental actors with influence on foreign 
policy, including Public Opinion, the Media, and Interest Group Lobbying, especially the Israel 
Lobby. The following is an overview of the role of these non-governmental actors in shaping the 
US foreign policy towards Palestine before 9/11.  
 
3.2.2.1. Public Opinion 
In a democratic country like the U.S., public opinion has become so important because 
the people are the ultimate source of power. Thus, any policymaker has to pay attention to public 
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opinion when formulating policy. The American public opinion can be defined as: ―the 
expression of ideas and matters of general importance by a significant number of people‖ 
(Hennessy 1981, 4). This means that public opinion has an important impact on U.S. foreign 
policy, especially at times of crisis. This impact is partially reflected through polls of public 
support foreign policies (Martel, 2002, 126).  
Public opinion influences US foreign policy towards the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Since 
before the establishment of Israel, Americans, both Republicans and Democrats, have strongly 
supported Israel. As Curtiss (1980) said: ―Clearly, most Americans feel that supporting Israel is 
the right thing to do. This American public support for Israel began in the post-World War II 
period‖ (Curtiss, 1980). Americans have historically favored the Israelis far more than the 
Palestinians, for many reasons, including that Israel is a vital strategic asset in the Middle East, is 
the only ―democratic country‖ in the Middle East, and viewed as a ―victim‖ of Palestinian 
aggression (Weldon, 2015). American public support for Israel is based on strategic ties, and 
religious ties, especially the ―Judeo-Christian‖ heritage, or the ―Old Testament‖ that is believed 
by most Christians and Jews. This Old Testament teaches that Jews were ―God‘s chosen people,‖ 
Palestine were their ―promised land,‖ and the return of the Messiah is dependent on the 
establishment of the state of Israel (Geddes & Griffiths, 2001, 6). The protection of the state of 
Israel became a religious duty.  
U.S. opinion polls indicate that Americans favor Israel especially during a crisis as this 
enhances Israel‘s value to the U.S. as a strategic ally in the Middle East. This sympathy is 
reflected through the Gallup Poll, in which Americans respond to consistently asked question: 
―In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or with the 
Arabs/Palestinians?‖ Beginning with the creation of the state of Israel in May 1948, ―more than 
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60 percent of Americans supported the creation of the state of Israel, and only 10 percent 
opposed it‖ (Rynhold, 2015, 19). Since then, Americans lean further toward the Israelis 
especially during periods of violence. During the 1967 Six Day War, American public opinion 
was more interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict than before. The Gallup Poll found that 45% of 
Americans sympathized with Israel, while 4% sympathized with the Arabs (Ruby, 2007). After 
the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 1982, the Gallup Poll found that the American sympathy with 
Israel had dropped from 49% to 32%, while the American sympathy with Arabs had increased 
from 10% to 28% (De Boer, 1983). This was reflected in the US government position towards 
the Arabs and especially the Palestinians in the 1970s and early 1980s; it refused to deal with the 
PLO, and refused the right of Palestinians to self-determination. However, Israel was seen as a 
strategic ally (Marrar, 2008, 30). Public opinion expressed concerns about Israel‘s security, while 
devaluing the Palestinian‘s right to exist. This was reflected in the U.S. one-sided foreign policy 
towards supporting Israel economically and militarily against its Arab neighbors (Scheindlin, 
2015).  
After the end of the Cold War, the American public backed the Clinton administration in 
its efforts to mediate the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. As Saad (2000) said: 
―Roughly one-third, 34%, say it should be a "very important" goal and an additional 43% say it 
should be a "somewhat important" goal. Only 20% say it is not important‖ (Saad, 2000). 
Americans favored a peaceful solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict, due to the American 
unipolarity in the new world order. In addition, the American tendency to sympathize more with 
the Israelis than the Palestinians fell in 1993 due to President Clinton‘s efforts to lead peace talks 
(Saad, 2015).  
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Different factors affected American public opinion towards Palestine before 9/11, 
including the Media, the Israeli Lobby, and Religion. The Media has the most influential role 
over American public opinion towards the Palestine-Israeli conflict. As Moughrabi (1986) said: 
―The media presented Israel in a favorable light and treated the Arab side in a negative manner 
(Moughrabi, 1986, 56). American media is biased towards Israel and thus helps to shape anti-
Palestinian public opinion. Prior to the First Intifada, Palestinians were considered terrorists and 
refugees, due to US media coverage (Moughrabi, 1986, 64). However, during the First Intifada, 
Palestinians and the PLO were considered legitimate due to media images of peaceful Palestinian 
protests against Israeli repression (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, 654). The majority of the public 
supported the endorsement of an independent Palestinian state and the participation of the PLO 
in the peace process. Richman (1989) argues that in 1988, the Gallup Poll found that 43% of 
Americans sympathized with Israel, while 20% sympathized with Palestinians (Richman, 1989, 
423). This shows a significant increase in pro-Palestinian sympathy.  
 
3.2.2.2. The Media  
In a modern and democratic country like the US, the media is the fourth pillar of 
government. This means that media is an important factor in foreign policy making. Media can 
be defined as ―the means of communication—such as radio, television, and news outlets—that 
reach or influence people widely‖ (Ford et al., 2015, 348). This means that, the media and 
especially the press play an influential role in shaping foreign policy. The media affects the 
public by: telling them what to think about, informing the public about government policies and 
how they will affect them and giving the government feedback on their policies by the public 
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(Soroka et al., 2012, 1). Thus, the media plays a mediating role between decision-makers and the 
public. US foreign policy is not made by the media, but it can‘t be made without it.  
American media helps shape US foreign policy towards the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The 
American media‘s coverage of the conflict tends to favor Israel over the Palestinians. As 
Barghouti (2017) said: ―Palestinians usually make it into mainstream coverage only when they 
are protesting or physically confronting Israeli aggression. Their outcry is referred to as an 
"escalation of violence" in the region. There is no "escalation of violence" when Israel steps up 
its night raids on Palestinian homes or settlers attack Palestinian farmers‖ (Barghouti, 2017). 
This means that the media narrative focuses usually on the Palestinians‘ reaction, and not on the 
initial Israeli action. Palestinians are presented as the offenders, while the Israelis are presented 
as the defenders.  
The US media tends to adopt the Israeli viewpoint of the conflict over the Palestinian 
viewpoint. The stereotyped image of Palestinians affects the perceptions of public opinion and 
policy makers towards the conflict. During the Cold War, Israel was seen as a strategic ally for 
the US. Thus, the news media coverage of the conflict favored Israel. Palestinian national 
identity was erased from the map (Kamalipour, 1997, 38). Palestinians were labeled either as 
Palestinian Arabs, or as refugees with no national identity. For the US mainstream media, 
Israel‘s violent actions were acceptable, but Palestinian reactions were not. During the 1967 War, 
Israel‘s illegal occupation of the Palestinian Territories was justified through Israel‘s right to 
self-defense (Hammond, 2016). However, during the 1970‘s, the US media attention focused on 
PLO violence, and this led to the delegitimization of the national struggle of the PLO in the eyes 
of the American public (Gilmour, 2016). During and after the First Palestinian Intifada, media 
coverage of Palestinians in the US media became less negative (Elmasry, 2009, 6). In addition, 
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the US media coverage of Israel remained positive, and supported the peaceful settlement of the 
conflict on Israeli terms. The US media supported Israeli demands for recognition and Israel‘s 
refusal to return to 1967 borders (Abu Rahmeh, 2012, 40).  
 
3.2.2.3. Interest Group Lobbying 
A wide variety of groups work to influence U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. 
The Israel lobby is the most powerful ethnic lobby in the U.S. (Uslaner, 2002). US foreign policy 
toward the Middle East, especially the Palestine-Israeli conflict, has always favored Israel due to 
the influence of the Israel lobby. This influence is reflected in the special relationship between 
the US and Israel, which is due to religious and cultural ties (Saleh, 2011, 164). According to 
Mearsheimer & Walt (2007), the Israel lobby is a ―loose coalition of individuals and 
organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction‖ 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, 5).  
The Israel lobby influences policymakers. The Israel lobby consists of key components, 
including the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and the Presidents‘ 
Conference, that help move American foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. Former Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once told an American audience: ―When people ask me how they 
can help Israel, I tell them, 'Help AIPAC‖ (McCormick, 2012, 98). This shows that AIPAC is the 
most effective interest group in serving Israel‘s interests.  
 The domination of American foreign policy toward the Middle East by AIPAC and the 
Israel Lobby as a whole is gained through different activities, including donating money to 
candidates, lobbying elected officials in the Executive and Legislative branches, voting in 
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elections, and molding public opinion by manipulating the media (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 
41). The Israel lobby is the most powerful lobby in Washington and thus candidates running for 
office must demonstrate they are pro-Israel to win the Jewish and increasingly, the Christian 
vote. As Palmer (2007) said: ―Pro-Israeli candidates were supported at all levels of American 
government, and the opponents of Israel were targeted for defeat‖ (Palmer, 2007, 237). This 
reflects Israel Lobby‘s power in American politics. In addition to pro-Israel candidates, Christian 
Zionist candidates are another source of the lobby‘s power, especially in Congress (Mearsheimer 
& Walt, 2006, 42).  
The Israel lobby succeeds in making US foreign policy a pro-Israel. During the Clinton 
Administration, a period which can be described as an active and unique period in the history of 
US interference in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the Israel lobby played an influential 
role (Kiely, 2017, 2). This was reflected in the number of pro-Israel officials who were among 
President Clinton‘s closest advisors. During the Clinton administration, AIPAC was the main 
architect of US foreign policy toward the Middle East, especially the Palestine-Israeli conflict. 
As Austin (2006) said: ―The four-person team in charge of setting the Clinton Administration‘s 
Middle East policy was all made up of members of AIPAC‘s policy division‖ (Austin, 2006). 
President Clinton‘s biased decisions towards Israel were influenced by his pro-Israel advisors. 
Such ties to Israel raised serious questions about America‘s ability to act as an honest broker. 
Martyn Indyk was a former deputy research director at AIPAC. Indyk supported the Oslo peace 
process and the creation of an independent Palestinian state, within the limits of what would be 
acceptable to Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 44). In addition, the Clinton administration was 
unable to pressure Israel to stop expanding settlements on Palestinian land due to the lobby‘s 
pressure (Mearsheimer, 2008, 147).  
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The lobby‘s impact on the Oslo Peace Process was effected by coordinating negotiation 
positions between the US and Israel. AIPAC also had an unchallenged hold on the US Congress. 
This was reflected in the number of pro-Israel laws and resolutions that were lobbied by AIPAC, 
including the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (Rynhold, 2015, 109). Moreover, the lobby‘s 
ambition was to make Israel the dominant regional power. This was reflected in the Oslo peace 
process which was in Israel‘s interest through the economic and security integration of Israel into 
the Middle East region (Al-Rousan, 2013, 211).  
This chapter has attempted to analyze the main determinants of US foreign policy and 
discusses the decision making process towards Palestine before 9/11. It discussed that the 
making of American foreign policy is very complex because of its many participants. Different 
determinants either domestic or international played an influential role in shaping U.S. foreign 
policy towards Palestine before 9/11. It provided a clear understanding of the main factors that 
affected the decision making process towards Palestine before 9/11. It is clear that Israel has 
always been a strategic ally for the U.S. in the Middle East. Thus, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
is viewed from an Israeli lens. It showed that the U.S. was concerned with terrorism before 9/11. 
During and after the Cold War, successive US administrations failed to find a comprehensive 
settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
The next chapter will discuss the main determinants of US foreign policy towards 
Palestine after 9/11.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
 DETERMINANTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 9/11 
This chapter defines the main determinants of US foreign policy and discusses the 
decision making process towards Palestine after 9/11, how foreign policy decisions are being 
made in the US, and by whom. This chapter will provide a clear understanding of the main 
factors that affect the decision making process towards Palestine after 9/11, and explain the 
justifications of decisions taken by policy-makers towards Palestine.  
US foreign policy is very complex because it is shaped by both international and 
domestic factors. Numerous actors inside and outside the state work to affect it. These 
determinants shape US foreign policy toward the Middle East in general and Palestine in 
particular. The following is an overview of domestic and international determinants that combine 
to shape US foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11.  
 
4.1. International Determinants 
Different international determinants shaped US foreign policy towards Palestine after 
9/11, including the structure of the international system, and national interests.  
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4.1.1. The Structure of the International System 
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US continued to be a world hegemon in a unipolar world. 
The U.S. aimed to maintain its hegemonic status and prevent regional instability through waging 
the War on Terror. Bush‘s warning that you are ―either with us or with the terrorists‖ was a clear 
declaration of U.S. supremacy in the region. For the US, Israel‘s actions against the Palestinians 
were part of confronting terrorism. As Hadar (2008) said: ―Israel was subjected to Palestinian 
terrorist attacks during the second intifada, and was considered a strategic ally of the United 
States in the war on terrorism and against rogue Middle Eastern regimes‖ (Hadar, 2008, 542).  
By launching the Road Map Plan for peace, the Bush administration supported the 
establishment of Palestinian statehood, but democratization and fighting terrorism were pre-
conditions for achieving this. Still, the Bush administration backed Israel‘s aggressive policies 
toward the Palestinians, including Operation Defensive Shield of 2002 (Kaussler & Hastedt, 
2017, 51). This shows that the plan was made for Israel‘s benefits. The Bush administration 
pressured the Palestinians to promote democracy, and fight terrorism. But, no effort was made to 
stop Israel‘s illegal policies in the Occupied Territories. The Bush administration‘s viewpoint 
was based on the idea that Palestinian violence was the source of all problems.  
 
4.1.2. National Interests 
The US increased its presence in the Middle East after 9/11 to protect its national 
interests. US foreign policy was driven by these national interests in the region. Several national 
interests shaped U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11, including securing strategic 
access to oil, ensuring the security of Israel, countering terrorism, and promoting democracy.  
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4.1.2.1. Access to Oil  
After the 9/11 attacks, Middle Eastern oil became more crucial to America‘s hegemony. 
The U.S. war on terrorism was used as a tool to gain the global acceptance of America‘s 
hegemony. As Stetter (2012) said: ―The 2003 Iraq war was a way of smashing resistance to US 
hegemony while consolidating the United States‘ grip over the Middle Eastern oil supplies 
needed by its economic competitors‖ (Stetter, 2012, 32). This means that America‘s war on 
terrorism was a way to maintain its hegemonic status, and safeguard access to cheap oil. Iraq is 
home to the world‘s second largest reserve of oil, so it holds key to stability in the region. The 
invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein‘s regime was about big profits for Anglo-
American oil companies. Accordingly, Ahmed (2014) argued that the real issue is described in a 
2001 report on ―energy security,‖ in which the threat posed by Iraq is the source of global 
vulnerability. The report illustrated that ―US officials had lost faith in Saddam due to his erratic 
and unpredictable energy export policies‖ (Ahmed, 2014). Iraq was a destabilizing influence to 
the flow of oil to world markets. Thus, the invasion of Iraq was meant to stabilize global energy 
supplies by ensuring the free flow of Iraqi oil to world markets. The U.S. was afraid of 
impending global energy crisis that would increase global vulnerability and energy price 
volatility. It was the expansion of an ―American empire.‖  
In addition, US control over Iraq‘s oil was consistent with Israel‘s security in the Middle 
East. As Noreng (2006) said: ―For the United States, getting rid of the Saddam regime in order to 
gain physical control of Iraq to secure access to oil and markets, as well as military bases to gain 
a foothold in the Middle East and secure Israel, seem to have been the major preoccupations‖ 
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(Noreng, 2006, xxxvii). Iraq‘s oil revenues would help improve Iraq according to the ―American 
model of democracy‖ and thus eliminate the possible recur of past Iraqi threats against Israel.  
.  
Israel emerged as a partner for the U.S. in fighting terrorism. The U.S. supported Israel 
against ―Palestinian anti-democratic terrorist groups.‖ The Bush administration did not see Israel 
as equally responsible for the violence and the failure to achieve peace. The Bush administration 
pursued Israel‘s security through asking the Palestinians to reform the Palestinian Authority, get 
rid of Arafat and fight extremism. These were preconditions for the Palestinians to achieve their 
independent statehood. On the other hand, the Bush administration did not condemn Israel‘s 
violence; rather it recognized Israel‘s right to defend itself against ―Palestinian terrorism‖ 
(Abrams, 2013, 42). The U.S. cared about solving the Palestine-Israeli conflict to maintain 
stability in the region. This was reflected in President Bush‘s Road Map for Peace in 2003 to 
solve the conflict on the basis of a two-state solution. However, Bush‘s plan failed to solve the 
conflict because it downplayed Palestinians‘ national rights, it failed to pressure Israel to 
withdraw from the occupied Palestinian Territories, and it failed to solve the final status issues, 
including borders, Jerusalem, the refugees, and the Israeli settlements (Mohamad, 2015, 80). 
Israel‘s security was a concern for the Bush administration after Hamas‘s victory in the 2006 
elections. Thus, the Bush administration decided to cut aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian 
Authority unless it agreed to renounce terrorism and recognize Israel (Hilal, 2013).  
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4.1.2.2. Security of Israel 
The new vision of the Middle East was in Israel‘s interest. Israel has become secure of 
external threats. American democracy promotion was a mean to encourage more cooperation and 
peaceful relations between Israel and the Arab countries. As Hamdi (2018) said: ―During this era 
(2001-2008), the U.S. policies aimed at pushing the Arab countries into many negotiations with 
Israel, based on the process of normalization in all fields. Therefore, this process covered future 
economic and security arrangements, arms control, regional security, economic cooperation, 
water, and environmental and refugees‘ issues‖ (Hamdi, 2018, 263). The U.S. adopted 
democracy promotion as a strategy to serve American national interests in the Middle East, 
including the security of Israel. For example, Saddam Hussein‘s regime constituted a major 
security threat to Israel. That is why the US occupied Iraq and got rid of him.  
After the 9/11 attacks, America and Israel were united as ―victims of terrorism.‖ The 
special relationship between the U.S. and Israel became stronger. Israel was a strategic partner in 
fighting terrorism. As Waxer (2013) said: ―After the attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001, the administration began once again to see Israel as a strategic partner 
against a common foe—instead of the Soviet Union, it was now terrorism‖ (Waxer, 2013, 23). 
This was reflected in the Bush administration‘s support for Israel‘s violent confrontations with 
the Palestinians both during the Second Palestinian Intifada and during Operation Cast Lead in 
2008. The Bush administration allowed Israel to handle Palestinian violence as it saw fit. Under 
Bush‘s agenda of unilateralism and promoting democracy, the U.S. ensured that Israel‘s security 
would be achieved if the Palestinians ever became democratic. In this vein, Bush led the Road 
Map for Peace plan to solve the Palestine-Israeli conflict.   
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4.1.2.3. Counter-Terrorism 
Since September 11, the U.S. has been involved in a global war on terror mainly in the 
Middle East. The attacks on the U.S. affected its foreign policy toward the Middle East in 
general and Palestine in particular. Fighting terrorism became the cornerstone of American 
foreign policy to maintain hegemony in the region. In his National Security Strategy of 2002, 
Bush believed that in order to achieve global security, terrorism should be defeated and 
democracy should be promoted. As Demant  & Finguerut (2015) said: ―Bush‘s strategy was 
immensely ambitious. He believed that victory in the war against terror would come when 
America‘s enemies would be transformed in democracies‖ (Demant  & Finguerut, 2015, 448). 
Terrorism was thus connected to the absence of democracy. The U.S. always needs a new enemy 
to maintain its hegemonic status in the world. Islam was the ―new enemy‖ of the U.S. and the 
new threat to U.S. national security. By doing so, the U.S. made Islam a substitute for 
communism. U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks reflected the 
―clash of civilization‖ between Islam and the West.  
With regard to the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Israel was America‘s most important friend 
in fighting terrorism. From Israel‘s perspective, Al-Qaeda actions against the U.S. were the same 
as the Palestinian resistance actions against Israel. As Hamdi (2018) said: ―In the post 9/11 
period, Israel succeeded in bringing the Palestinian resistance to the core of the international 
campaign against terrorism.‖ (Hamdi, 2018, 264). Israel succeeded in winning the world‘s 
sympathy for that. The Bush administration supported Israel‘s aggressive policies in the 
Occupied Territories with military supplies. This American support provided a cover for Israel to 
violate the rights of Palestinians. For Bush, Israel‘s security would be achieved only through 
promoting democracy. Thus, Bush asked the Palestinians to reform the Palestinian Authority to 
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achieve their independent statehood. According to Hamdi (2018): ―Bush‘s vision was to 
establish a Palestinian state that was territorial, sovereign and governed by democratic 
institutions‖ (ibid). This position aimed at achieving Israel‘s security. Bush‘s plan to solve the 
Palestine-Israeli conflict based on the two-state solution was a cover to let Israel blame the 
Palestinians for the failure of peace.  
4.1.2.4. Democratization 
The Bush administration claimed that the absence of democracy led to Islamic terrorism. 
Democracy promotion became a strategic tool of U.S. foreign policy to counterterrorism. Efforts 
were made by the U.S. to deal with the root causes. U.S. officials found that democracy was the 
best way to counterterrorism. As Udayangani (2016) said: ―Democracy promotion is thus 
presented as an intrinsic, even central, element of the US war on terrorism‖ (Udayangani, 2016, 
10). The US increased its foreign aid  to reform non-democratic governments in the Middle East, 
because it is central to the war on terror. The Bush administration created many democracy 
promotion programs to support positive change, including the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) in 2002, and the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) in 2004, which emphasized 
economic, political, and cultural, social reforms. These programs were implemented by many 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, including the USAID (Lawson, 2017). 
Democracy promotion was supposed to become more central in political participation and 
diplomatic representatives.  
Democracy promotion was necessary to safeguard American national interests, including 
the security of Israel. Democratic Iraq would serve as a role model to other countries in the 
region. Authoritarian regimes have long been supported by the US, including Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia. However, democracy promotion became an important national security goal to maintain 
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peace and stability in the region. According to Fürtig (2009), ―The theorem of ―Democratic 
Peace‖ stipulates that democracies refrain from waging war on one another. Therefore, according 
to this theorem, the best way to combat terrorism in the long run would be to democratize the 
Middle East‖ (Fürtig, 2009, 11). Building democratic Arab states would allow for cooperation 
and peaceful initiatives between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Democratization would deprive 
terrorist groups of their political basis, and their conflict with the West would be a non-violent 
one. U.S. policy-makers emphasized how the violation of human rights, such as the political 
exclusion by repressive regimes provided fertile ground for the adoption of Islamic methods. 
Thus, it was a ―war of ideas,‖ in which the U.S. would work to reverse the spread of extremist 
ideology in the region.   
The U.S. supported free elections in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. For the US, the 
corruption and authoritarianism provided fertile ground for terrorism against Israel. As Turner 
(2006) said: ―The US and Israel maintain that the second Intifada was the result of corruption 
and authoritarianism in the PA, not Israeli actions or the deteriorating socio-economic situation 
in the WBG‖ (Turner, 2006, 746). For the US, internal reform was necessary for building 
democracy in the Occupied Territories. But it was not necessary for building an independent 
Palestinian state. The slogan of the Road Map was ―democracy now, peace later,‖ shows that the 
U.S. was concerned with democratizing the Palestinian Authority to meet Israel‘s interests, than 
maintaining peace and building an independent Palestinian state.  The Road Map was not clear 
about the borders of the Palestinian state. As Farsakh (2005) argued that the Road Map is vague, 
because it calls for establishing a Palestinian state, without identifying its borders; whether the 
1967 borders, or anything else (Farsakh, 2005, 178). This gives Israel the upper hand in serving 
its interests. Israel continued to impose policies that are at odds with having an independent 
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Palestinian state, including the security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, control over 
the Palestinian economy, the building of the Apartheid Wall, the expansion of Jewish 
settlements, Jerusalem, and the refugees. All these final status issues were reserved to negotiated 
resolution between Israel and the Palestinians. The Palestinians had fulfilled some of their 
obligations, and they were tied to Israel‘s security concerns.   
U.S. democracy promotion is contradictory in the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The U.S. 
allowed Hamas to participate in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006. However, the 
victory of Hamas was rejected by the US. Unfortunately, the U.S. who had insisted on the 
importance of conducting free and fair elections, opposed the results of these elections. As 
Mousavi (2011) said: ―It seems that American hesitation and half-measures about democracy 
promotion can be explained by two reasons. The first reason is that democracy promotion results 
may be unfavorable to Washington and may not be in concert with America‘s preferences‖ 
(Mousavi, 2011, 118). The U.S. who had stressed on the importance of civil society 
empowerment and the ability of individuals to express their opinion, did not respect Palestinians‘ 
democratic choice. The Bush administration did not recognize the victory of Hamas, because the 
later does not recognize Israel. The U.S. ignorance of Hamas‘s victory underestimated Bush‘s 
―Freedom Agenda,‖ and proved U.S. double-standard policy.  
 
4.2. Domestic Determinants 
U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11, is shaped by different domestic 
determinants. These domestic determinants can be divided into two types: Formal Domestic 
Determinants and Informal Domestic Determinants.  
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4.2.1. Formal Domestic Determinants 
Under the US Constitution, both the Executive branch (the President) and the Legislative 
branch (Congress) have the power and the legal authority to make the US foreign policy. The 
following is an overview of the important roles played by both the Executive Branch and the 
Legislative Branch. 
4.2.1.1. The President 
After 9/11, the US became more supportive of Israel because they both believed they 
were in a similar struggle against terrorism. Thus, the holy land had become part of the global 
war on terror. President George W. Bush was the first American president to endorse an 
independent Palestinian state. As Bush stated in his 2002 National Security Strategy: ―If 
Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on 
American support for the creation of a Palestinian State" (Bush, 2002). This shows that Bush 
recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination but he required fighting terrorism and the 
democratization of the political system as a precondition for having this right. By doing so, Bush 
shifted the focus from Israeli occupation to domestic Palestinian politics (Yaghi, 2007, 171). 
This policy provided a cover for Israel to increase its illegal actions against the Palestinians. 
Further, Bush decided to renew the stalled peace process through outlining the Road Map for 
Peace to solve the Palestine-Israeli conflict. However, this peace process was a one sided vision: 
it asked everything from the Palestinian government, but asked nothing from the Israeli 
government (Mohammad, 2015, 82). Thus, it failed to solve the conflict, and exert pressure on 
Israel to stop the expansion of its illegal settlements and to withdraw from the occupied 
territories.  
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Different factors combined to shape George Bush‘s foreign policy towards the conflict. 
The traditional frame of reference affected Bush‘s policy. As Azar (2011) said: ―As Bush came 
to office, the Bush administration sided with Sharon to strangle the Palestinian national 
movement under occupation and label it terrorism‖ (Azar, 2011, 40). This shows that Bush was 
influenced by anti-Palestinian bias and mindset through blaming the Palestinians for the 
violence, and the collapse of the peace process, without understanding Palestinian grievances and 
perspectives. Further, Bush‘s policy towards Palestine was influenced by the neo-conservative 
approach, in the name of religion. This was shown through Bush‘s unlimited support for Israel 
against the Palestinians. As Hilal (2013) said: ―Indeed, the neo-conservatives in the 
administration have also urged Bush to grant Israel all the freedom it needs to combat Palestinian 
violence‖ (Hilal, 2013). Bush‘s biblical beliefs were reinforced by his neoconservative‘s advisers 
who were pro-Israeli, including his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, they sought to give the 
Israeli government a free hand to suppress the Palestinians during the Second Intifada, and 
considered Arafat a terrorist equivalent to Bin Laden (Ryan, 2010).  
 
4.2.1.2. Congress 
After 9/11, fighting terrorism has become the top national priority for the US with the full 
support of the Congress. Lawmakers felt they had a national duty to stand behind the President in 
his ―war against terrorism.‖ U.S. Congress played a significant role in combating international 
terrorism by passing resolutions, bills, and acts. In response to the terrorist attacks, Congress 
passed a resolution called the Authorization for the Use of Force (AUMF) in 2001, which 
authorized President Bush to ―use all necessary military force against terrorists.‖ This resolution 
allowed the US to invade Iraq and Afghanistan to prevent future attacks against the US. As 
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Zoughbie (2014) said: ―Based on flawed intelligence, Congress granted the president the 
authority to go to war, and the neoconservative House Majority Leader Tom Delay 
enthusiastically promised that ―whatever the president deems necessary to fight would be 
granted‖  (Zoighbie, 2014, 59). It was essential for the U.S. to show unity in a time of crisis. In 
addition, Congress passed the Patriot Act in 2001 to find terrorists and those who financed them. 
The Patriot Act was a vital weapon against terrorism.  
After 9/11, Congressional attention to Israel increased sharply due to the shared battle 
against terrorism. Congress passed many resolutions pressing support for Israeli actions in the 
Occupied Territories. In 2003, Congress passed the FY 2003 Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, included $9 billion for Israel‘s economic recovery, to finance the Israeli 
efforts against the Palestinian Intifada (Mark, 2005, 5). Congress was controlled by Zionist 
neoconservatives and conservatives who were able to shift the congressional decisions in a pro-
Israeli direction. For example, House Majority Leader Dick Armey held a view of the Palestine-
Israeli conflict that ―Israel should grab the entire West Bank ‖ and that the Palestinians should 
move to neighboring Arab countries (Zoughbie, 2014, 36). This view shows the centrality of 
Israel in foreign policy. With regard to terrorist financing, Congress restricted direct aid to the 
PA in 2003, because they were concerned that this money would be used to finance terrorist 
activities against Israel.  
After 9/11, AIPAC continued to ensure Israel‘s security through lobbying Congress. As 
Mearsheimer & Walt (2006) said: ―On November 16, eighty-nine senators sent Bush a letter 
praising him for refusing to meet with Arafat, but also demanding that the United States not 
restrain Israel from retaliating against the Palestinians and insisting that the administration state 
publicly that it stood steadfastly behind Israel‖ (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 51). This shows that 
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by working with Congress, AIPAC sought to ensure Israel‘s security and interests through 
isolating President Yasser Arafat, because they considered him a terrorist. With regard to the 
Road Map, the Zionist lobby backed Sharon‘s expansionist goals in the Occupied Territories. As 
Petras (2011) argued that after Bush‘s efforts in mediating the Palestine-Israeli peace process 
through the Road Map, the Zionist lobby turned Bush and Congress into political idiots through 
backing Sharon‘s expansionist plan (Petras, 2011).  
4.2.2. Informal Domestic Determinants 
The foreign policy of the United States is also influenced by non-governmental actors. 
The following is an overview of the role of these non-governmental actors in shaping the US 
foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11. 
 
4.2.2.1. Public Opinion 
After 9/11, public views of Muslims and Islam have grown negatively. The perception of 
Muslims as a cultural threat is due to media stereotyping of Islam. Americans believed that they 
were involved in a clash of civilizations; the West versus Islam. As Mekhoukh (2013) argued 
about the media, ―being strongly influenced, it has played an effective, but mainly negative role 
in shaping the American perception of Islam and Muslims after 9/11‖ (Mekhoukh, 2013).  This 
negative stereotypical of Muslims and Arabs in U.S. media led the American public to support 
Bush‘s Freedom Agenda in the Middle East, such as the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan to 
spread ―freedom and democracy.‖ It is very clear that these goals have not been achieved. 
American public support for Israel increased immediately after 9/11. The Gallup Poll 
found that American support for Israel was at its highest rate, due to Israel‘s strategic importance 
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to the U.S. As Jones (2001) said: ―A majority of Americans (55%) in the September 14-15 poll 
say their sympathies in the Middle East situation lie more with the Israelis than with the 
Palestinian Arabs, while 7% take the opposite view‖ (Jones, 2001). Americans continued to 
support Israel following the 9/11 attacks and the fall of the peace talks. The Gallup Poll found 
that in October 2000, 41% of Americans sympathized with Israel, while 11% of Americans 
sympathized with Palestinians. However, the Gallup Poll found that in June 2002, 49% of 
Americans sympathized with Israel, while 13% of Americans sympathized with Palestinians 
(Carroll & Newport, 2006). The rise in sympathy for Israel was due to Americans tendency to 
believe that Palestinians were more culpable for the collapse of the Oslo Accords. 
Following the 9/11 attacks, Palestinians were viewed more negatively by the American 
public due to media coverage. Images of Palestinians celebrating the 9/11 attacks undermined 
US public opinion of the Palestinians (Exoo, 2010, 45). Americans support for Israel was at its 
highest rate since the 1991 Gulf War. A Gallup Poll conducted in February 2003, found that 58% 
of Americans sympathized with Israel, while 13% sympathized with Palestinians (Gallup, 2004, 
70). This increased sympathy for Israel was due to its strategic importance especially in the Iraq 
War. However, Palestinians were perceived as mainly to blame for the failure of peace talks and 
lack of conflict resolution. Americans felt that both the US and Israel were fighting the same war 
against terrorism. Religion plays an important role in shaping American public opinion towards 
the conflict. 70% of Americans are Christians and they believe in the Jews‘ right of return 
(Cavari, 2014, 7). Thus, the American public tends to support Israel over the Palestinians. 
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4.2.2.2. The Media  
After 9/11, stereotypic treatment of Arabs and Muslims was reinforced by U.S. media. 
Arabs and Muslims were portrayed as terrorists, violent and barbaric. The US represents 
civilization, while Islam represents barbarism. As Pintak (2006) said: ―the U.S. media 
immediately fell back on the prevailing—and stereotyped—narrative about Arabs and Muslims 
and reverted to its historic tendency to present the world, in Henry Kissinger‘s words, as ‗a 
morality play between good and evil‖ (Pintak, 2006, 39). This deepening tension and hostility 
between the US and the Muslim world is a result of US media portrayal of Muslims and Islam. 
Islamophobia has become the mainstream discourse in U.S. media. This clash of civilization is a 
result of President Bush‘s speech; ―you are either with us, or against us.‖ In this speech, the 
enemy was created and was described as evil, brutal, and violent. It was a struggle of good ―us‖ 
versus evil ―them.‖ U.S. media rallied behind their president and they started using terms such as 
―us‖ and ―them,‖ they linked the terrorist acts with Islam. This implies that all Muslims are 
―bad‖ unless they proved their loyalty to America.   
Following the 9/11 attacks, Palestinians were portrayed negatively, while Israelis were 
portrayed positively in U.S. media. Israelis were the victims, while Palestinians were the 
aggressors. Recognition of Palestinian humanity was rare. During the Second Palestinian 
Intifada, the US mainstream media was one-sided; suicide bombings were the headlines, while 
Israel‘s violent attacks were ignored. The US media adopted the Israeli viewpoint of the conflict. 
As Keramati (2008) said: ―At times the information given about them was inaccurate. Other 
times the media contrasted Palestinian action with the great reflections given to Israel‖ 
(Keramati, 2008, 148). For U.S. media, when Palestinians killed Israeli civilians, they were 
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terrorists, while when Israelis killed Palestinian civilians, they were soldiers. The media did not 
show that Palestinians and Israelis were equally responsible for the conflict.  
Policies and actions were influenced by perceptions. The framing of Palestinians in the 
media played a significant role in how US policymakers understand Palestinian claims. As Ross 
(2003) said: ―The image presented by the editorials is that the entire Palestinian population 
consists of suicide bombers. The typical Palestinian is a conflagration of hate, a plague of death, 
a suicide cult, and a puppet spouting anti-American and anti-Israeli vitriol‖ (Ross, 2003, 62). 
Violence and terror were stereotypical Palestinian behaviors. The New York Times was one 
American newspaper involved in media bias in reporting numbers of deaths. During Operation 
Cast Lead in 2008-2009, the New York Times coverage was biased toward Israel. As Caballero 
(2010) said: ―Although Palestinians died at a rate 106 times more than Israelis, the New York 
Times engaged in a practice of media bias that resulted in coverage of only 3% of Palestinian 
deaths in the headlines and first paragraphs‖ (Caballero, 2010, iv). This shows that media bias 
affects the news coverage of the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The US media tends to distort the facts 
of the conflict to show Israel in a favorable light.  
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US mainstream media were influenced by different 
factors, including culture, and the Israeli lobby. The shared culture between the US and Israel is 
a major factor explaining bias in favor of Israel. As Saariaho (2015) said: ―The one important 
factor is the cultural proximity of Israel to the West, especially to the American culture. As a 
result, the American public identifies with the Israelis‖ (Saariaho, 2015, 8). This cultural bias 
was reflected in the US media through presenting Israelis as victims, democratic and civilized, 
while Palestinians were violent terrorists, and backward. Thus, the US media ignored Israeli 
abuses of Palestinians and focused on Palestinian violence.  
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The Israeli Lobby played an influential role in shaping media coverage of the Palestine-
Israeli conflict after 9/11. The lobby worked hard to shape American public opinion in a positive 
way about Israel. American commentators were and are usually pro-Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt, 
2006, 20). Following the 9/11 attacks, the lobby argued that Israel and the US are partners in the 
War on Terror (Marrar, 2008, 11). This media coverage was intended to justify what it regarded 
as Israel‘s right to self-defense against Palestinian violence. Moreover, major media outlets 
including CNN, Fox News, ABC, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journals, and the 
Washington Post were under pressure from the Zionist lobby to adopt the Israeli viewpoint 
(Umar, 2008).   
 
4.2.2.3. Interest Group Lobbying 
AIPAC and the Israel lobby as a whole succeeded in placing Israel‘s interests at the top 
of US foreign policy agenda following the 9/11 attacks. This goal was served by the existence of 
pro-Israel individuals in the Bush administration, including Elliot Abrams and John Bolton, who 
pushed pro-Israel policies (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 45). The Israel lobby worked to convince 
the Bush administration and the American people that the US and Israel had a shared enemy. As 
Mearsheimer & Walt (2006) said: ―Israeli officials and lobby representatives repeatedly 
emphasized that there was no real difference between Arafat and Osama bin Laden, insisting that 
the United States and Israel should isolate the Palestinians' elected leader and have nothing to do 
with him‖ (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006, 51). The Israel lobby succeeded in making Israel a 
strategic ally for the US in fighting terrorism. The 9/11 attacks helped the Israel lobby equate the 
Palestinian violence with Al-Qaeda terrorism. This comparison was meant to prevent the Bush 
administration from criticizing Israel‘s policies toward the Palestinians. In addition, the Israel 
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lobby put pressure on Bush to change key words in the Road Map of 2003 to fit with Israel‘s 
wishes, including changing the term ―Palestinian state‖ into democratic, or peaceful, with no 
mention of independent (Barnes, 2017, 35).  
After 9/11, Congress was heavily influenced by the Israel lobby in a pro-Israel direction. 
As Findley (2003) said: ―Even as evidence of worldwide outrage against U.S. complicity with 
Israel‘s assault on the West Bank Gaza mounted, a large majority of members of both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate remained beholden to AIPAC (Findley, 2003, 350). AIPAC‘s 
influence on Congress remained strong through supporting Israeli aggressors and blaming 
Palestinian victims. In addition, President Bush received a message by 89 senators asking him to 
refuse to meet with Arafat. They did not question Israel‘s policies toward the Palestinians. As a 
result, the US-Israeli relationship had improved considerably since 9/11 (Mearsheimer & Walt, 
2006, 52).   
This chapter has attempted to analyze the main determinants of US foreign policy 
towards Palestine after 9/11. It argued that American foreign policy, goals, and interests towards 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict did not change. The Bush administration failed to find a 
comprehensive settlement to the conflict, and the US position regarding the two-state solution 
ignored the national rights of the Palestinian people and maintained Israel‘s security. Thus, there 
was a connection between the War on Terrorism and the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. The Bush administration‘s goal was ―democracy now, peace later.‖  
The next chapter will discuss in more details the US foreign policy towards Palestine 
after 9/11.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
ـــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــ  
 US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PALESTINE AFTER 9/11 
This chapter has attempted to analyze the reasons behind the Bush administration‘s 
decision to offer recognition to an independent Palestinian state. It will discuss under what 
conditions would a strategic and ―realist‖ American foreign policy elite make such a substantial 
change in policy that on its surface appears so favorable to Palestinians.   
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US continued to face challenges to protect its hegemonic 
status and national interests in the Middle East and globally. Regionally, these challenges were 
terrorism and managing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. As Robel (2014) said: ―The 
challenges of Bush administration‘s Middle East policy were terrorism, promoting Arab Israel 
peace.‖ (Robel, 2014, 29). The Bush administration viewed the Middle East as the ―base camp‖ 
for threats to US national security and stability. US policymakers enacted a series of policies 
deemed necessary to safeguard American national interests in the region. These fundamental 
national interests remained unchanged: securing access to oil, ensuring the security of Israel, 
fighting terrorism, and promoting democracy. In order to protect these national interests, and 
implement their policies, US policymakers employed a realist perspective to promote the goal of 
regional stability. Foreign policy officials designed policies to tackle the root causes of terrorism, 
and thus manage and reshape the Middle East according to American interests. As Jervis (2003) 
argues, the US, serving as the only responsible superpower in the world, must maintain its 
hegemony through spreading democracy and modernity and acting in ways others cannot and 
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must not (Jervis, 2003). For the Bush administration, influencing domestic political structures in 
the region‘s states through a variety of means became a US security necessity in the war against 
terrorism, especially after the shocking events of 9/11. American policies ranged from repressive 
to supportive, and officials believed promoting democracy – through both ―top-down‖ regime 
change and ―bottom-up‖ civil society building efforts – would help stabilize the region and draw 
excluded and disadvantaged groups away from extremism and toward peaceful participation.  
The US aimed to change the status-quo to promote regional stability and security. The 
US linked regional stability to the reform of national political processes. As Yacoubian (2008) 
argues, absent such change, the continuity of the status-quo would provide further ground for 
extremism (Yacoubian, 2008). Regime change and democracy promotion became a top priority 
in US foreign policy to promote regional stability and maintain American hegemony. For the 
Bush administration, democratization was the solution to terrorism and extremism. This radical 
shift reflects that American foreign policy is flexible to respond to changes in facts on the ground  
and as national interest dictates.  
US-Israeli relations grew closer after the 9/11 attacks. The US renewed support for Israel 
to promote regional stability and safeguard American interests. The US treated Israel as its most 
important strategic ally in the war against terrorism. As Troy (2012) argues, 9/11 was a crucial 
step in Israel‘s efforts to gain strong American support for IOF incursions into the Occupied 
Territories. US officials believed that the US and Israel faced common threats from common 
enemies. The Bush administration assumed an unquestioned tolerance of the illegal Israeli 
actions against the Palestinians. Accordingly, Shlaim (2003) argues that the Bush administration 
not only supported Sharon‘s claim of linking the Palestinian Authority and its leader Arafat to 
terrorism, but participated in marginalizing Arafat (Shlaim, 2003). Furthermore, Bush considered 
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Sharon as a ―man of peace‖ and Arafat as an ―obstacle to peace.‖ The Bush administration 
further tilted the balance towards Israel.  
American‘s unlimited support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, increased anti-
Americanism in the Middle East. The US decided to try again to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict to gain Arab support for the war against terrorism. As Durrani (2002) argued, ―But this 
had a counter-effect as Sharon's escalation against the Palestinians was perceived in the US as "a 
damaging diversion from the response being prepared" to nab the September 11 perpetrators and, 
thus, detrimental to obtaining the crucial support of Arab and Muslim countries for the US-led 
anti-terror coalition.‖ (Durrani, 2002, 40). The Palestinian-Israeli conflict posed a serious threat 
to American national interests Bush officials believed, because it fueled anti-American Islamic 
terrorism and extremism. Resolving the conflict became a primary goal of the Bush 
administration to promote stability and safeguard American national interests in the region. 
Freedman (2005) argues that during his first months in office, President George W. Bush 
opposed expanding US involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Bush administration 
did not want to repeat the failure of Clinton‘s efforts and thus weaken the American position in 
the region. As Secretary of State Powell said: ―The United States stands ready to assist, not 
insist.‖ The US did not force peace, but would only offer to facilitate the peace process. 
However, the Bush administration changed this ―hands-off‖ policy towards the conflict and 
sought to launch a major initiative due to the 9/11 attacks (Freedman, 2005). In order to maintain 
its hegemonic status in the region, the US sought to involve itself more fully in the peace process 
between Palestinians and Israelis.  
For the Bush administration, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was a motivator for terrorism  
and the root cause of all conflicts in the Middle East. Resolving the conflict was necessary for 
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regional stability, and for the security of Israel. As Schmemann (2001) argues, following the 
9/11 attacks, the US was subject to criticism from its closest allies in the region due to its failure 
to end the violence between Palestinians and Israelis. Resuming an active role in mediating the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict was imperative to achieve US objectives. This also brought the 
conflict back to the forefront at the United Nations. Because of the bloody conflict, Bush 
supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state on November 10, 2001 as called for in 
the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the approach known as ―land for peace.‖ 
(Schmemann, 2001).  
US policymakers developed statements of support for a ―two-state solution‖ in the 
conflict. As Quandt (2010) argues, Powell‘s rational view was that the US would need the 
support of Arab and Muslim states in the war against terrorism. In order to gain this broad 
coalition, he believed the US should do more to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Quandt, 
2010). Resolving the conflict was in America‘s interest to lessen Arab‘s anger at the US. Bush 
followed Powell‘s view by pursuing a policy designed to give Palestinians some hope in 
achieving their independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Christison (2004) notes that 
following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush issued the strongest statement endorsing the idea of 
establishing an independent Palestinian state. In a speech at the United Nations on November 10, 
2001, Bush announced that: ―We are working for the day when two states--Israel and Palestine –
live peacefully together within secure and recognized boundaries.‖ Furthermore, Powell called 
for an end to Israel‘s occupation. In a speech at the University of Louisville on November 19, 
2001 Powell said: ―Israel must be willing to end its occupation and accept a viable Palestinian 
state.‖ (Powell, 2001). This was the first time an American president recognized the Palestinian 
right to self-determination, and had formally used the terms ―Palestine‖ and ―Israel‘s 
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occupation.‖ (Christison, 2004). Accordingly, Vulliamy (2001) argues that this shift in US 
foreign policy reflected a new US commitment to an independent Palestinian state. As part of 
this commitment, the Bush administration pressed Sharon to establish a cease-fire and allow 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to meet with Arafat, despite the fact that violence had not ended 
yet. Directly following his speech on November 19, 2001, Powell sent his Former Marine 
General Anthony Zinni to meet with Israelis and Palestinian delegations to reach a ceasefire that 
would get the peace process back on track (Vulliamy, 2001).  
Thus, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Palestinian state was formally affirmed as a 
US goal. Zoughbi (2014) emphasizes that Palestine in fact was a laboratory for the entire region, 
in that democracy should be promoted first through the Palestinian Authority. As the Second 
Palestinian intifada was destabilizing the Middle East, US policymakers in June, 2002, including 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice advised Bush to deliver a ―game-changing‖ speech on  
Palestine (Zoughbi, 2014). Furthermore, Rice took the lead in conceptualizing this presidential 
speech, in which Bush would call for the establishment of Palestinian state with provisional 
borders and democratic leadership not compromised by terror. As a result, on June 24, 2002, 
Bush laid out his vision for peace in the Middle East by saying that the US would support the 
creation of ―a peaceful and democratic Palestinian state alongside Israel.‖ (Bush, 2002). In this 
heavily pro-Israel speech, Bush called for a ―provisional‖ Palestinian state with a democratic 
leadership not compromised by terror. Bumiller & Sanger (2002) argues that Bush‘s speech was 
in fact tough on the Palestinians, and it was intended to end the violence between Palestinians 
and Israelis. It was the first time the US made the replacement of Arafat into a precondition for 
the creation of a Palestinian state. Bush warned the Palestinians that their state ―will never be 
created by terror.‖ The removal of Arafat and the election of a new and different Palestinian 
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leadership became the price for a Palestinian state (Bumiller & Sanger, 2002). In the Bush‘s 
―freedom agenda,‖ democracy and freedom were presented as the only ways to win the war on 
terrorism. Obviously, greatly enhanced security state capacities in the US, Israel, Palestine, and 
around the world would play a crucial role as well.  
As a democratically-elected leader, Arafat was marginalized and delegitimized by the 
Bush administration. Rice insisted that Arafat and his entire leadership did have to go if there 
would be peace in the Middle East, to protect the Palestinians‘ right to self-determination, and to 
get the Palestinian people the leadership they deserve. The foundation of the Palestinian state 
must be transparent, democratic, and anti-terror. In her interview on Fox News Sunday on May 5, 
2002, Rice said: ―We are not going to try to choose the leadership for the Palestinian people. 
Chairman Arafat is there … but he does have responsibilities that he has not been meeting and 
we are going to press him‖ (Rice, 2002). Bush was convinced by the idea of Palestinian reform. 
As a result, in his most anti-Arafat speech in June 24, 2002, Bush called for Arafat‘s ouster as a 
precondition to the creation of a provisional Palestinian state. The Bush administration offered a 
deal: if terrorism stopped, the US would mediate the peace process, and support the creation of a 
provisional Palestinian state. No peace would be achieved without denouncing terrorism. The 
existence of Arafat and the rest of his leadership was destabilizing the region. Democracy 
promotion in Palestine was necessary for regional stability. Dalacoura (2005) argues that a 
democratically elected Palestinian leadership would denounce violence and support peaceful 
talks with Israel (Dalacoura, 2005). This reform which included the creation of a Prime Minister 
post aimed to weaken Arafat. Bush had pointedly and repeatedly criticized Arafat and refused to 
meet him because there was no such thing as a ―good terrorist.‖ Sciolino & Tyler (2001) argues 
that this refusal was due to Arafat‘s unwillingness to root out terrorists and denounce violence. 
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Accordingly, Rice said to Arafat: ―You cannot help us with al-Qaeda, and hug Hizballah or 
Hamas.‖ (Sciolino & Tyler, 2001).  
As violence escalated further during January 2002, Bush‘s negative portrayal of Arafat 
increased. With Israeli intelligence‘s evidence of Arafat‘s link to terrorism, Bush‘s criticism of 
the Palestinian leader increased. Bush considered Arafat as a terrorist, not as a partner of peace. 
As Barnea (2006) argues that in January 2002, the discovery of the ―Karine-A‖ ship 
demonstrated Arafat‘s link to terrorism and his involvement with Iran. The Karine-A was 
carrying 50 tons of weapons from Iran. Israeli intelligence claimed that the Karine-A was owned 
by the PA, although Arafat denied any knowledge of the ship. The US warned Arafat that if he 
did not take necessary steps to stop violence, he would ―complicate enormously‖ his relations 
with the US. The Bush administration believed that Arafat would make no real progress toward 
peace. (Barnea, 2006). The two-state solution would never happen with Arafat in power. The 
Bush administration wanted to prevent the conflict from getting worse, and focused on Arafat‘s 
role. Rather than counting on Arafat to make changes, the Bush administration called for 
Arafat‘s replacement. For Bush, this reform was urgent and necessary to America‘s interests. 
This was direct US involvement in the Palestinian policy. Rice (2011) argues that Bush was less 
concerned about the creation of a Palestinian state,  than he was concerned about ―What kind of 
Palestinian state?‖ Bush wanted to protect the Palestinians‘ right to self-determination both from 
Israel and from their own corrupt Authority (Rice, 2011, 143). Thus, it seems clear that 9/11 
colored Bush‘s perception of Arafat as a leader of a new Palestinian state.  
Similarly, Christison (2004) argues that Bush‘s call for the end of terrorism and the 
election of a new and different Palestinian leadership as a precondition to the creation of a 
provisional Palestinian state, was in Israel‘s interest. Bush‘s initiative to achieve a ―just peace‖ 
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was acceptable to Israel, and ―he again limited the initiative in response to Israel‘s demands and 
again required that terrorism stop before there could be any movement towards peace.‖ Indeed, 
the replacement of Arafat had always been Sharon‘s goal and agenda. Sharon succeeded in 
convincing Bush that Arafat was Israel‘s Bin Laden (Christison, 2004, 39). On the other hand, 
Rice (2011) argues that Bush‘s speech had broken a taboo by challenging the Israeli claim that 
―there was no Palestinian partner for peace.‖ (Rice, 2011, 147).  
Sanger (2002) argues that following his anti-Arafat speech on June 24, 2001, Bush 
threatened to cut aid to the Palestinians if they did not remove Arafat and elect a new and 
different leadership. In the speech, Bush said:  ―we won't be putting money into a society 
dominated by corrupt leadership that helps to finance terrorists‖ (Sanger, 2002). The Bush 
administration used foreign aid as a tool to prevent Palestinians from re-electing Arafat. 
Furthermore, the Bush administration strongly supported ―Operation Defensive Shield‖ on April 
3, 2002, in which Israel surrounded Arafat‘s compound in Ramallah and reoccupied major cities 
in the West Bank. Accordingly, Rice (2011) argues that the Bush administration believed that 
Israel had a right to defend itself. However, on May 10, 2002, the US was in ―the midst of a full-
blown Middle East crisis and a deepening split with Israel‖ due to the Arab nations‘ anger at 
Israel‘s aggressive actions in the Occupied Territories. The crises caused by the Israeli 
Occupation Forces‘ siege around the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, where dozens of 
Palestinian militants were hiding and seeking refuge. Bush was convinced by Powell‘s view that 
Israel‘s ongoing carnage against innocent Palestinians was a serious threat (Rice, 2011, 138). As 
a result, on April 7, 2002, Bush asked Israel to withdraw without delay from the West Bank. And 
on September 24, 2002, the US chose to abstain on, rather than veto a UN resolution 
condemning the Israeli actions in the Occupied Territories. This shift in US policy represented an 
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attempt to gain support for the planned invasion of Iraq, especially with the rise of anti-American 
feelings in the region (Barnea, 2006).  
Bush‘s speech on June 24, 2002 formed the basis for the Road Map for Peace. This three-
phase approach was launched on April 30, 2003 and was intended to resolve the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict on the basis of the two-state solution. The Road Map was backed by the United 
States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia. Furthermore, this plan put security 
ahead of a political agreement. Bennet (2003) argues that Bush‘s peace initiative called on 
Palestinians and Israelis to revive trust and ―end the violence and return to a path of peace.‖ In 
exchange for statehood, Palestinians must stop violence against Israel, and make democratic 
reforms. Israel must accept these reforms and stop all settlement activity in the Occupied 
Territories. The plan offered the Palestinians a state with provisional borders, and maintained 
Israel‘s security (Bennet, 2003). Palestinians needed to work in phases to achieve their 
independent state. Similarly, Covarrubias & Lansford (2007) argue that the Road Map for Peace 
was consistent with the Bush Doctrine in calling for democracy promotion and leadership reform 
in the Occupied Territories as a precondition for independence (Covarrubias & Lansford, 2007). 
Mohamad (2015) argues that the Road Map for Peace marked a shift in US foreign policy 
towards Palestine through backing the creation of an independent Palestinian state, for the first 
time in US history (Mohamad, 2015). After the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, the US 
decided to restart the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. Christison (2004) argues 
that the return of American mediation was due to pressure from the British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair to resolve the conflict because it was in America‘s interests. This was to ―repay‖ for Blair‘s 
support in the war against Iraq. And the US‘s successful removal of Saddam Hussein‘s regime in 
Iraq had given the US new status as a regional power (Christison, 2004).  
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The Bush administration was unwilling to ensure the implementation of the Road Map, 
although it was their greatest contribution to resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There was 
no real pressure compelling the parties involved to meet guidelines. As Hallward (2011) argues, 
the Road Map obligations were not enforced, and the two parties failed to go beyond phase 1, 
which called for an end to Palestinian violence, leadership reform, and Israel‘s withdrawal from 
the Occupied Territories (Hallward, 2011). The US leadership on the Road Map was missed. 
After the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as PA Prime Minister on April 29, 2003, which was 
conditional for peace to move forward, the Bush administration withdrew its support for the plan 
because the US was not serious about resolving the conflict. And ―no Quartet monitoring 
mechanism, informal or otherwise, was ever established—not even one that clearly laid out a 
dominant role for the United States‖ (Elgindy, 2012, 12). The US was not serious about 
monitoring the parties‘ fulfillment of their obligations. The Bush administration was unwilling to 
implement the Road Map principles. As Mohamad (2015) argues that Bush did nothing to ensure 
the implementation of the Road Map principles by Israel. That was due to Bush‘s 
misunderstanding of the issues involved, his inability to pressure Sharon to freeze the 
construction of settlements, and domestic political pressure from pro-Israel officials (Mohamad, 
2015). Similarly, Elgindy (2012) argues that the Road Map for Peace was a short-lived success 
because of its third phase, which did not present a single word regarding the ―final status‖ issues, 
including Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and borders, although these issues were the heart of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There was no clarification of what the solution would look like 
(Elgindy, 2012). 
 The Road Map for Peace put the establishment of security before a final settlement. The 
Bush administration had focused on Palestinians to ensure their compliance with Israel‘s security 
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interests. Rynhold (2008) argues that for Israel and the US, Palestinian fulfillment of the plan‘s 
first phase was a precondition for the implementation of a peace agreement (Rynhold, 2008). The 
success of the Road Map was dependent on Palestinian‘s fulfillment of their security obligations. 
Thus, Palestinians were responsible for advancing any peace process. Furthermore, Johnson 
(2010) argues that Bush was unwilling to address the underlying reason behind the Palestinian 
violence which was the Israeli occupation (Johnosn, 2010). The Road Map for Peace failed to 
move peacemaking forward. Instead, it helped Israel in maintaining the status-quo of no 
negotiations in the Occupied Territories.  
The Bush administration has done little to help the creation of a Palestinian state. Israel 
failed to meet its Road Map obligations. In order to freeze the peace process, Israel withdrew 
unilaterally from Gaza Strip in 2004. As Myre (2004) argues, Israel‘s unilateral disengagement 
from Gaza was intended to put the creation of an independent Palestinian state on indefinite hold 
(Myre, 2004). Furthermore, Israel was still establishing the Apartheid Wall which was first 
authorized in June 2002. This wall was an obstacle to Palestinian movement because it was 
constructed on large areas of Palestinian lands in the West Bank and thus cut off Palestinians 
from their communities and families. The apartheid wall made the humanitarian situation even 
worse in the Occupied Territories. Hilal (2007) argues, this development made the creation of a 
Palestinian state almost impossible because the Apartheid Wall was constructed on the territories 
where the Palestinian state would be created as called in the Road Map for Peace (Hilal, 2007). 
On July 25, 2003 President Bush criticized Israel‘s apartheid wall and considered it a problem 
because it ―makes it very difficult to develop confidence between the Palestinians and Israel.‖ 
(Kessler, 2003).  
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In order to appear as an honest broker between Palestinians and Israelis, the US 
threatened to cut aid to Israel. Weisman (2003) argues that Bush‘s disapproval of the apartheid 
wall was reflected in reducing bilateral assistance to Israel. The Bush administration looked for 
ways to press Israel to stop construction of Apartheid Wall that separates between the Israelis 
and Palestinians. As a result of wall construction, the Bush administration studied the possibility 
of cutting $9 billion in loan guarantees for Israel that were approved by Congress. This pressure 
from Washington was due to the negative impact of Apartheid Wall on the Palestinian land and 
on the prospects for peace, or more importantly, stability. The wall started to take over 
Palestinian land, and cut Palestinians off from their homes, farms and schools. Furthermore, the 
wall would threaten the Road Map to Peace (Weisman, 2003).  
This chapter has attempted to analyze the reasons behind the Bush administration‘s 
decision to offer recognition to an independent Palestinian state. First, this US foreign policy was 
implemented from a realistic approach. Following the 9/11 attacks, US policymakers decided to 
safeguard American national interests in the Middle East by seeking stability by re-balancing its 
relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The Bush administration changed its ―hands-off‖ 
policy towards the conflict and sought to launch a major initiative. The US decided to seek to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict primarily to gain Arab support for the war against 
terrorism. The conflict posed a serious threat to American national interests, through fueling anti-
American Islamic terrorism and extremism in the region at a very fluid moment. For the first 
time in US history, the US backed the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside 
Israel. The US aimed to change the status-quo to promote regional stability and security. Second, 
the US linked regional stability to local ―democratic‖ reforms. The Bush administration called 
for the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders and democratic leadership 
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not compromised by terror. The replacement of Arafat was a precondition to the creation of a 
Palestinian state. The two-state solution would never happen with Arafat. By doing so, Bush 
challenged the Israeli claim that Palestinians failed to find their Nelson Mandela. The Bush 
administration backed the Road Map for Peace in order to reaffirm the two-state solution. 
However, Bush‘s backing for Israel‘s aggressive actions, helped it in maintaining the status-quo 
of no negotiations and promote the ―facts on the grounds‖ in the Occupied Territories. Thus, 
while the recognition of the Palestinian state appears to be a remarkable and unprecedented 
concession, adopting a realist worldview helps us to see that it was primarily aimed to cement 
American interests in the region, albeit in new ways. It is fundamentally important to recognize 
that stability and not justice was the overreaching motivation for the Bush administration‘s 
move. Indeed, one can interpret the initiative as primarily a counter-terrorism strategy. 
Regionally, the move was intended to reduce anti-Americanism among Arab countries and 
peoples. Within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the move was offered only as an explicit quid pro 
quo, that the Palestinians replace Arafat as their leader. While framed as pro-democracy, this 
demand was clearly an anti-democratic imposition, again aimed primarily to reduce the role of a 
leadership team that the Bush administration perceived as too militant if not actually as terrorist-
based.  
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CONCLUSION 
The American foreign policy towards Palestine after 9/11 was implemented from a 
realistic approach. The US was not serious about resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but 
managing the conflict in a way that safeguarded its national interests in the Middle East. 
President Bush used his initiatives to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to pass his violent 
plans in the Middle East. Bush decided to recognize the Palestinian state, for the first time in US 
history to gain Arab support for the war against terrorism. The US interfered in Palestinian 
domestic politics through asking the Palestinians to make certain reforms, remove President 
Yasser Arafat, and denounce terrorism, as both the US and Israel regard the resistance of the 
Israeli occupation as terrorism. These were pre-conditions if the Palestinians wanted to achieve 
their independent state. These reforms aimed to weaken Arafat and increase the power of the 
newly created post of Prime Minister. It is fundamentally important to recognize that stability 
and not justice was the overreaching motivation for the Bush administration‘s move. Indeed, one 
can interpret the initiative as primarily a counter-terrorism strategy. Regionally, the move was 
intended to reduce anti-Americanism among Arab countries and peoples. On the other hand, US-
Israeli relations grew closer after the 9/11 attacks. The US renewed support for Israel to promote 
regional stability and safeguard American interests. The Bush administration supported Israel on 
the expense of the Palestinians. The success of the Road Map was dependent on Palestinian‘s 
fulfillment of their security obligations. On the other hand, the Bush administration was 
unwilling to implement the Road Map principles. Bush did nothing to ensure the implementation 
of the Road Map principles by Israel. That was due to Bush‘s misunderstanding of the issues 
involved, his inability to pressure Sharon to freeze the construction of settlements, and domestic 
political pressure from pro-Israel officials. The US succeeded in giving Israel enough time to 
84 
 
impose the ―facts on the ground and thus maintaining the status-quo of no negotiations in the 
Occupied Territories.‖ Thus, the US was never an honest and neutral broker between 
Palestinians and Israelis. 
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